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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the response of the U.S. Army to the barrage of criticism immediately after World War II directed against alleged abuse of enlisted men. The criticism directed at the War Department can be categorized into two types: first the immediate dissatisfaction with the "slowness" of the demobilization and second with internal Army practices, such as traditional officer-enlisted relationships, which allegedly made the service unattractive to prospective volunteers. The response

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to the demobilization clamor was not effective in maintaining sufficient numbers of effective military forces. The Doolittle Board (formal title: The Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships) on the other hand was in general successful in relieving the criticism of internal practices while maintaining essential military procedures for the preservation of discipline.

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Demobilization and Democratizing Discipline: The Doolittle
Board and the Post World War II Response to Criticism of the
United States Army

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Final Report, 29 April 1983

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

Thesis submitted to Duke University, Durham N.C. in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of arts.

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DEMOBILIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZING DISCIPLINE: THE
DOOLITTLE BOARD AND THE POST WORLD WAR II
RESPONSE TO CRITICISM OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMY

by

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of Arts in the Department of History
in the Graduate School of
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PREFACE

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the response of the U.S. Army to the barrage of criticism immediately after World War II directed against alleged abuse of enlisted men. By historical analysis one may gain some insight into considerations which might apply to present and future problems of a similar nature. The introductory chapter sets the stage by developing the traditional reaction of Americans to the end of a major conflict. A wave of complaints and criticisms against harsh military discipline and needless harassment appeared again after World War II despite a world situation that was radically different from anything that had existed before.

When faced, for the first time in U.S. history, with the need for a large standing Army in peace, Americans confronted a question that is still unresolved today: given the noisy complaints of disgruntled protesters, how can a democracy recruit sufficient numbers of qualified men to serve in the armed forces? The initial response to this problem was a series of proposals to democratize the military establishment in order to make service more attractive to peacetime volunteers. The War Department's objective in this debate was to preserve its ability to execute its primary mission of ground combat. The Doolittle board,

appointed by the Secretary of War, became the vehicle for coping with this controversy. It sought to answer a basic question for all free societies: how--if at all--can discipline be democratized?

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Russell F. Wiegley in his now standard, The American Way of War notes that ". . . the American public clamored for rapid demobilization after the Axis surrenders, just as wartime forces had been demobilized quickly after all previous American ventures in the use of combats."¹ Given this circumstance, a study of postwar public reactions as well as governmental attempts to respond to them should lead to useful insights for policy-makers in the future. There are undoubtedly significant technological, geographical and organizational differences in the nation's wars over the years from 1776 until 1945. On the other hand, the fact that some reactions consistently recur despite these variables suggests that they may well occur after some future conflict. To gain useful insights from our experience it will be helpful to identify some of these recurring postwar responses.

Any number of similarities may be gleaned from a study of postwar reaction to the major conflicts of the nation. First, the American people have consistently applied public pressure for rapid demobilization in the aftermath of conflict. Second,

¹Russell F. Wiegley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 368.

this clamor for demobilization has traditionally adopted the view that the number one priority in postwar periods is to "bring the boys home" regardless of the continuing requirements of national security. Third, the wartime requirements for order and discipline seem to produce a reaction against the existing "caste" system in officer-enlisted relationships as soon as the emergency is over. Finally, and somewhat related to the officer-enlisted man problem but apparently a twentieth century phenomenon, is the clamor after World Wars I and II for reforms in military justice.

Before considering the similarities of the postwar historical experience, an appreciation of the differences may help in assessing the value of the findings from each particular conflict. Dixon Wecter in his 1944 book, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, decided to focus on the three major struggles in American history: the Revolution, the Civil War and World War I. Wecter argued that a study of the other conflicts had little to offer us in the way of lessons learned. He notes that in the other wars only small numbers of soldiers needed to be mobilized. The smaller conflicts were short, desultory and far from either the geographical or emotional heart of the nation. They were waged by volunteers, involved only minor economic resources and the societies of the period were able to reassimilate the small numbers involved without undue disruption.² On the whole these smaller wars provide fewer insights than do the major struggles

²Dixon Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home (Cambridge; Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1944), pp. 5-6.

upon which his book is centered.

While Wecter asserts that the Revolution, the Civil War and World War I "stand in a class apart" John C. Sparrow in his 1952 work, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army, limits the list of useful experience to the two more recent conflicts. He states that only in the Civil War and World War I were more than a million men under arms and that "Little if any objective material on demobilization is available on [conflicts] prior to the Civil War."³ On the other hand he does allow that the Revolution and the War with Spain contributed something to our experience. While he includes short passages describing the War of 1812 and the Mexican War he notes that they contributed very little that can be used in large-scale demobilization planning.⁴ On the other hand, even in the first war that this nation fought many of the reactions were very similar.

The impact of demobilization after the Revolutionary War was somewhat lessened because of the practice of discharging short term enlistees over extended periods of time. The total number of men who served is a controversial subject. The various sources do not even agree on such basic figures as the total population of the colonies or the number of men of military age available for service. The current best estimate seems to be

³John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 2.

⁴Ibid., pp. 4-5.

that no more than 100,000 different men actually bore arms on the American side out of a pool of approximately 250,000 men of prime fighting age.⁵

During the lull between the end of active campaigning in 1781 until the final peace treaty in 1783 the rank and file of the army had an abundance of time to dwell on the hardships and injustices of their service. By May of 1783, after the news of the preliminary treaty of peace became known, the general cry 'We enlisted for the war and the war is over!'⁶ became more and more common. In June Washington proclaimed that all who had enlisted for the duration were eligible for indefinite furlough and thirty-five thousand discharges were printed for the men then in uniform. The army was disbanded during a two-week period between 5 and 18 June 1783.⁷

The pressures for rapid demobilization ignored the continuing requirements for a standing army to provide Indian defense in both the North and Southwest and also to overwatch the British who continued to garrison some frontier forts in defiance of the Treaty of Paris. This assertion is, perhaps, best supported by the fact that by 2 June 1784 the eighty-six or so regiments of the Continental Army had dwindled to a pathetic

⁵Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1971), p. 389. Other sources quite a wide range of numbers, Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, p. 6, 232,000 out of 700,000 possible; Sparrow, Demobilization, p. 4, 400,000 total enrolment.

⁶Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, p. 33.

⁷Ibid., p. 37.

force of eighty men and their assigned officers posted to guard military stores at West Point and Fort Pitt.⁸ Congress realized that a larger force was needed and in subsequent years gradually rebuilt the force that they had so quickly disbanded.

In the wake of the Revolution, and subsequently to become a routine American postwar reaction after each conflict, was the problem of officer-enlisted relations. This first democratic revolution strained the traditional class lines that existed in that period. During the trying times of the war one of the difficulties expressed by General Washington in maintaining a fighting army, pertained to the sometimes tense relations between officers and men.⁹ After the war complaints arose from the planter gentry, from which many of the officers had come, that 'everyone who bore arms, esteemed himself upon a footing with his neighbor.'¹⁰ When the state militias failed to heed the call of Congress for troops to protect the frontiers, the new nation gradually shifted its dependence from citizen soldiers towards the more traditional regular force. These men "purchased from prisons, wheelbarrows and brothels"¹¹ knew their place and the citizen-officer friction subsided until the War of 1812.

⁸Wiegley, History of the United States Army, pp. 80-82.

⁹U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, S. Doc. 196, p. 2. [Hereinafter referred to as Doclittle Report.]

¹⁰Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, p. 55.

¹¹Wiegley, History of the United States Army, p. 91.

The War of 1812 may provide fewer lessons concerning large-scale demobilization but many of the postwar reactions were similar to those of the Revolution. Approximately 70,000 men were on active duty by the end of 1813.¹² After the War economic pressures resulted in the speedy discharge of the militia and the volunteers. Despite President Madison's warning that the desire for economy should not lead to an immediate and radical reduction in the size of the army,¹³ the active force was chopped to 10,231 by 1816 and Congress reduced that force to a mere 5,773 by 1821.¹⁴

Once again the reduction in the regular military establishment stemmed from postwar pressure to "send the boys home" and to save money rather than a careful evaluation of the needs of national security. Arguments were presented before Congress pointing out the need for an "adequate regular force"¹⁵ to meet the threat posed by hostile Indians, Spaniards, and British who would help Spain in the event of war.¹⁶ Congress ignoring these arguments promptly returned the Army to a peacetime basis by disbanding all excess regiments and the regular force gradually

¹²Ibid., p. 121.

¹³Edgar Bruce Wesley, Guarding the Frontier: A Study of Frontier Defense From 1815 to 1825 (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1935), p. 66.

¹⁴U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 737. [Hereinafter referred to as Historical Statistics.]

¹⁵Madison quoted in Wesley, Guarding the Frontier, p. 66.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 75.

fell to pre-war manning levels.¹⁷

Despite a relative American advantage in officer-enlisted man relations as compared to the rigid British system, postwar complaints were still heard. Major General Jacob Brown maintained that the British enlisted man was less effective than the American, and speculated that this was a result of social gulf between the grades.¹⁸ In his argument for large reductions in the regular force, Congressman Lewis Williams of North Carolina maintained that standing armies were dangerous to liberty. He claimed that military life made officers feel superior, and even in civilian life they would not associate with former privates on terms of equality.¹⁹ This evidence suggests once again that American democratic ideals conflicted with what some would claim were essential military requirements.

The Nation's next major armed conflict, the Mexican War, was somewhat peculiar to the history of America's wars in several ways. The major campaigns were fought by regulars since the common militia, essentially a home defense force, was not suitable for operations on foreign soil. The manpower and economic resources of the country were never severely tested. No more than about 50,000 men were in the service at any given time.²⁰

¹⁷Historical Statistics, p. 737. Strengths: for 1810 - 5,956; 1821 - 5,773.

¹⁸John K. Mahon, The War of 1812 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972), p. 366.

¹⁹Wesley, Guarding the Frontier, pp. 86-87.

²⁰Wiegley, History of the United States Army, p. 183.

Perhaps the only fair comparison that can be made is the fact that once the war was over the volunteers were discharged and most of the new Regular formations created during the war were quickly disbanded.²¹ Despite the increased security requirements of the vast new frontier, the Army quickly reverted to a peacetime strength somewhat smaller than the 10,000 authorized in 1815.²²

With the end of the Civil War many problems developed that not only repeated earlier experience with demobilization but reflected the problems of mass citizen armies encountered in subsequent wars. On 1 May 1865 1,000,516 officers and men were on duty in the active force. By the end of the year only 199,553 were still serving, and this figure fell to less than 40,000 by July 1866.²³ This rapid demobilization was spurred on by a rising clamor of complaints from men who thought they had done their duty and from their families who wanted them home after years of hardship.²⁴

The pressure on legislators and the military won out over the continuing requirement for regular troops. The uncertainty of the postwar situation made an assessment of the number of troops needed to maintain order difficult. Not only did the Army have responsibilities in implementing Reconstruction in the conquered South but also to meet Indian unrest in the Far West

²¹Ibid., p. 189.

²²Historical Statistics, p. 737.

²³Wiegley, History of the United States Army, p. 262.

²⁴Sparrow, Demobilization, pp. 5, 7.

and the threat of Emperor Maximilian south of the border.²⁵

All of these threats influenced General Grant when he asked Congress to expand the regular force to 80,000—a force that had number over a million a little more than a year before.²⁶

Once again the encounter of large numbers of American citizens with the regular army procedures and practices caused some problems with officer-enlisted man relations. Some men in the ranks of both North and South voiced resentment against those "aristocratic" officers, who, it seemed were more interested in rank and privileges than in the welfare of their men.²⁷ The average private or non-commissioned officer with his rural American background often resented the so-called "caste" system of the Army. One Civil War private wrote that after the original volunteers in the Army of the Potomac had been killed in the early fighting they had to be replaced by "bounty-jumpers" in the winter of 1863-64. He observed that:

The whole army was rapidly assuming the character and bearing of regular troops, and that means mercenaries. The lines drawn between the recruits of 1863-64 and their officers were well marked and they were rigid. The officers were resolute in their intention to make the recruits feel the difference in their rank.²⁸

The argument for this social distance can be gleaned from the writings of Thomas Wentworth Higginson, a volunteer officer who

²⁵Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, p. 137.

²⁶Wiegley, History of the United States Army, p. 262.

²⁷Doolittle Report, p. 2.

²⁸Henry Steele Commager, The Blue and the Gray: The Story of the Civil War as Told By Participants, 2 vols. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950), Vol. 1, pp. 598-99.

had commanded a Negro regiment during the war. He observed that no officer could act like a chairman, foreman, moderator, or landlord because the "army is an aristocracy" and military power cannot be made effective on democratic principles.²⁹

The combined effects of imperfect officer selection procedures and the generally higher quality of enlisted men in times of national emergency tended to exacerbate the superior subordinate problem. Higginson observed that:

In many cases there is really no more difference between officers and men, in education or in breeding, than if the one class were chosen by lot from the other; all are from the same neighborhood, all will return to the same civil pursuits side by side³⁰

This breakdown in the traditional differences between officers and men had its effect on the military efficiency of the units. According to Higginson "the discipline of our soldiers has been generally that of a town-meeting or of an engine company, rather than that of an army; and it shows the extraordinary quality of the individual men, that so much has been accomplished with such a formidable defect in the organization."³¹ While these few bits of evidence by themselves are not sufficient to prove the point, they do suggest that a problem existed—a problem that would grow with the mass armies of the twentieth century.

The final conflict of the nineteenth century, however, had yet to be fought. The Spanish-American War was in many ways

²⁹Ibid., pp. 482-83.

³⁰Ibid., p. 484. For an interesting parallel in the post World War II period see Doolittle Report, p. 4.

³¹Commager, The Blue and the Gray, p. 484.

similar to the Mexican War. In both of them the fighting was done by regulars and volunteers, the battles were all fought on foreign soil and they were both of short duration and placed very little strain on the manpower resources of the nation. By the time the Armistice was signed with Spain the army counted a total of 274,717 officers and men on its rolls.³²

When hostilities ended the growing power of the press combined with the more traditional forces and once again raised a clamor to bring the troops home.³³ One example of the pressure exerted on Congress and the Executive Department was that of a group of Kentucky citizens who petitioned the War Department for the early return of the 1st Kentucky Volunteer Regiment. In response to the petition the commander, a former Confederate officer, wrote the Adjutant General, War Department: ". . . Friends in Kentucky have no authority for asking that the First Kentucky be relieved from duty. These men are soldiers. The government will determine when the regiment is no longer needed . . ."³⁴ This is a thought that Americans might well have kept in mind after their first experience with a mass citizen army in a foreign war.

Of all the conflicts before 1939, the demobilization at the end of World War I was by far the most comparable to the situation in 1945, especially with respect to postwar reactions.

³²Wiegley, History of the United States Army, p. 298.

³³Concerning the press see Wiegley, History of the United States Army, p. 309. Concerning the clamor to demobilize see Sparrow, Demobilization, p. 8.

³⁴Sparrow, Demobilization, pp. 8-9.

While the magnitude of the demobilization in 1918-1919 was itself to be greatly overshadowed twenty-seven years later, the Great War demobilization was several times larger than anything that had gone before. Since nearly all who served in the War were eligible for prompt discharges once the Armistice was in effect the rush to demobilize surpassed even that of the Civil War. On 11 November 1918 the Army contained some 3,685,458 men.³⁵ By June 30, 1919 no fewer than 2,608,218 enlisted men and 128,436 officers had been discharged. By 1 January 1920 only 130,000 men remained under arms.³⁶ The unprecedented speed of this operation was spurred on by equally unprecedented pressure both from the men themselves and their loved ones and the legislators back home.

The demobilization had scarcely begun when the War Department became the target of attacks and criticism from the public and from Congress. Faced with unprecedented economic and labor problems the planners at first considered several policies to minimize the effect of releasing large numbers of men at one time. In the end, however, they were forced by the public, the press and Congress to adopt the plan that involved the least delay rather than the most desirable or logical.³⁷ With the signing of the Armistice the numbers of grumbling letters from overseas increased dramatically.³⁸ The folks back home in turn.

³⁵Wiegley, History of the United States Army, p. 358.

³⁶Ibid., p. 396.

³⁷Sparrow, Demobilization, pp. 14-16.

³⁸Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, p. 274.

increased pressure directly by writing the War Department and indirectly by complaining to their Congressmen.³⁹ In mid-January 1919 a block of Congressmen led by Representative James Gallivan of Massachusetts, began to clamor for the immediate return of the troops.⁴⁰ Certainly many who urged immediate discharge were sincere but just as certainly many politicians refused to listen to the repeated common sense explanations of the War Department and chose to add clamor rather than thoughtfulness to the debate.

Just as continuing requirements for regular forces had been subordinated to the immediate desire for rapid demobilization in the past--so too this happened after World War I. Unrest along the Mexican border required more troops than had been expected. But the main problem stemmed from the fact that the Germans had not surrendered unconditionally and their armed forces had retreated intact. The Allies were required to keep units ready to insure that they would accept the terms of the final peace treaty.⁴¹ Once again the most important consideration in the postwar period became speed of demobilization rather than obscure, though certainly real, national security objectives.

The postwar officer-enlisted man recriminations increased proportionally with the greater numbers involved and with the twentieth century concepts of equality. An assistant to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker submitted a survey of conditions in

³⁹Sparrow, Demobilization, p. 17.

⁴⁰Wecker, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, pp. 292-93.

⁴¹Sparrow, Demobilization, pp. 18-19.

the Army in 1919 in which he noted the

bitterness engendered among the enlisted men by special privileges accorded the officer personnel (privileges that have no military significance nor value) who are in many instances mental and moral inferiors of half of their subordinates.⁴²

This bitterness is reflected in the journal of a private at the front on Armistice Day who, when he saw a general's car stuck in the mud, wrote, "It won't be long until we get back home, and I'll be just as important as you then."⁴³ Many of the complaints were repeated verbatim after the next great war. Some of the more common objections--and those that one hears more of later--included: Inequities in the types of food served to officers and men; "For Officers Only" signs on the best cafes and restaurants; saluting, which to many soldiers seemed unnecessary after the Armistice; and rumors of Y.M.C.A. secretaries who would only consort with officers.⁴⁴ All of these complaints had been heard before but others that had been insignificant in the past were now raised more pointedly.

The post-World War I clamor for military justice reform seems to be a twentieth century phenomenon. The Articles of War in effect during the War were essentially the same as the code enacted in 1775. Court-martial abuses and what critics have called "outrageously severe" sentences led to the first public movement for the civilianization of military law. Changes in civil law during the latter part of the nineteenth and early

⁴²Doolittle Report, p. 2.

⁴³Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home, p. 259.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 275-77.

twentieth centuries extending due process rights along with vast changes in technology made a break with previous military leadership practices seem desirable.⁴⁵ While some reforms were made, most of the proposed changes were shelved.⁴⁶ Perhaps this was due to the fact that by 1920 the Army had once again become a small regular force largely drawn from the less favored segments of society and no longer involved the rights of the great majority of middle and upper class young men. Regardless of the reasons for the failure, the same pressures were to be felt again when the next mass citizen army was organized.

The same pressures at work after every other war in the history of the United States Army were felt once again in 1945. The onset of the nuclear age and the Cold War made America's military response more critical than after any previous conflict. This study will seek to determine if the response of the U.S. Army to public criticism was effective in maintaining essential internal military practices for the preservation of discipline. The large issues of demobilization and national objectives will be discussed insofar as they provide the necessary background to the more restricted topics of officer-enlisted man relations and the reform of military justice. While the latter two questions are not as sweeping in scope as the former, they form the

⁴⁵Edward P. Sherman, "The Civilianization of Military Law," Maine Law Review 22 (1970): 5.

⁴⁶Herbert F. Margulies, "The Articles of War, 1920: The History of a Forgotten Reform," Military Affairs 43 (April 1979): 89.

basic foundation upon which the unit building blocks of the nation's military system are based. To understand the pressure for change on the more esoteric issues, however, an appreciation of the wider context, specifically demobilization, is necessary.

CHAPTER II

DEMOBILIZATION

On 2 September 1945 the Imperial Japanese Government signed the instrument of surrender on the deck of the USS Missouri, thus officially ending World War II. Even before the ink was dry, however, pressure began to build from unhappy soldiers, their loved ones and their Congressmen to bring the boys home quickly.

To understand the later criticism directed at the War Department concerning internal practices such as officer-enlisted relationships and military justice a review of the immediate post-war pressures for demobilization that dominated the period from September 1945 until the spring of 1946 will be helpful in setting the stage. It was this emotional period of uncertainty that formed the basis for the internal criticism which peaked during the early spring of 1946. Once the fighting ended, servicemen around the world wasted no time in airing their complaints.

Unhappy, angry, disgruntled soldiers began to complain of the inevitable delay in their discharge before the Japanese officially surrendered.¹ Even men who had not served overseas

¹"Peace Shock," Time 46 (27 August 1945): 24.

thought they should have been released immediately. For example, one soldier at Ft. Benning, Georgia complained in a letter dated 5 September 1945--three days after V-J Day--that he was ". . . being kept here . . . along with thousands of others, doing needless tasks or nothing at all."² He claimed that while he and his companions were glad to serve their country when they felt they were needed, by 5 September they felt ". . . the need is no longer there."³ Another basic trainee stationed at Fort Belvoir for four months testified before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on 19 September 1945. In addition to a series of complaints that ranged from insufficient bed sheets to claims that the main occupation at Fort Belvoir was cutting grass with bayonets, the soldier stated flatly that, "We believe that the demobilization is too slow."⁴ If rookies such as these who had never been overseas, much less seen combat, were so quick to complain about the delay, one might well imagine the reactions of long service combat soldiers stationed at lonely, miserable spots around the world.

From September 1945 through the spring of 1946 letters complaining about the slowness of demobilization were sent from soldiers to loved ones and Congressmen. Many of these men could not understand that shipping was not available to get them home

²U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 17 September 1945, Congressional Record 91: 8639.

³Ibid.

⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Demobilization of the Armed Forces, Hearing on S. 1355. 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, pp. 165-67, quoted from p. 167. [Hereinafter referred to as Hearings, S. 1355, 1-2.]

as fast as they would have liked. Thus their letters placed the blame on "brass hat" inefficiency or even conspiracy. Acting Secretary of War, Kenneth C. Royall, perhaps summed up the problem best while testifying before a Senate Committee when he said, "Without arguing that these things are misrepresentations, still I say that a fellow who wants to come home can think of a lot of reasons why he should be sent home. Some of those stories might be slightly exaggerated."⁵

In addition to the pressure of the soldiers themselves the folks back home were almost as quick to raise objections. On 17 September Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce pointed out that "there is no Congressman on the Hill today who is not under constant and terrific pressure from servicemen and their families to secure their release from the Army wherever they may be."⁶ Approximately 200 "Bring Back Daddy" clubs were organized by servicemen's wives throughout the country. In December 1945 they stamped Congressional mail with pairs of baby shoes including attached cards pleading "Please bring back my daddy."⁷

⁵U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Demobilization of the Armed Forces, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 1355. 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, p. 279 (hereinafter referred to as Hearings. S. 1355, 3). Any number of letters could be cited to substantiate this claim. For a sampling see U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 14, 16 November 1945, Congressional Record 91: A4878, A4880, A4883, A4885, A4936.

⁶U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 17 September 1945, Congressional Record 91: 8656.

⁷R. Alton Lee, "The Army 'Mutiny' of 1946," Journal of American History 53 (1966): 558-59; J. Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe: An Autobiography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), pp. 342-43; "Ike & the Noose," Time 47 (4 February 1946): 25.

Despite the deluge of mail and emotional pleas several public opinion polls taken at the time suggest that the pressure on Congress came from small but well-organized groups. For example, in a poll taken on 20 September 1945 only twenty-three percent thought that demobilization should be accelerated, while fifty-six percent felt that the rate was fast enough.⁸ On 22 November a National Opinion Research Center poll reported that fifty percent of those polled believed that the army discharge system was fair while forty percent believed changes were needed.⁹ Despite the apparent lack of decisive public sentiment, Congress was not slow to respond to a potential grass-roots issue.

The deluge of letters, telegrams, and baby shoes repeatedly induced Congressmen to attack the War Department for foot-dragging on demobilization. Sometimes these attacks went beyond what could be called the sincere objections of a loyal opposition. In fact, many approached sheer demagogery. Consider, for example, the line of questioning pursued by Senator Chapman Revercomb of West Virginia during Hearings on 17 October 1945, before the Committee on Military Affairs. In response to a letter from a man in the service, the Senator wanted to know why on various days in August 1945 this serviceman counted 300 ships in San Francisco Bay, 350 ships at Pearl Harbor, at least 500 ships at Eniwetok, 400 at Ulithi and at least 500 at Manila Bay.¹⁰ Since the War Department claimed that transportation was one of the principle

⁸The results of the poll are cited in Lee, "Mutiny 1946," p. 559.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Hearings, S. 1355, 1-2, pp. 198-99.

factors in determining the speed of demobilization his question was essentially: why weren't these ships bringing the boys home instead of lying at anchor? One might well imagine the thoughts of Admiral H. A. Flanigan, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Transportation, when he answered the question the following day. The Admiral pointed out that there were 11,500 ships and 31,000 landing crafts of large size or 41,500 [sic] vessels that could be counted as "ships" in the Pacific at the end of the war. Given a turn-around time of about three months and the fact that many of these ships were combat loaded for the invasion of Japan in numerous instances, lacking adequate port facilities for unloading, the Senator's question seems almost ludicrous.¹¹

Other inquiries involving complaints of individuals as the basis for condemning the general War Department plan were equally absurd. During the same committee session on 17 October, a sergeant who had never served overseas and had thus accrued only thirty-two discharge points (at the time seventy points were required) argued that he was eligible for immediate separation based on his qualification under a program to discharge surplus personnel. Surplus low point men were to be discharged only when a particular discharge station ran out of qualified high point men. If any other policy had been followed, a soldier based in the United States who had joined the army on V-J Day and declared surplus the day after would have had the same priority for discharge as a man who had fought from North Africa to the Rhine. This was at a time when the entire capacity

¹¹Ibid., p. 247.

of the demobilization stations was taken up with discharging high point men. Thus the sergeant may have been legitimately declared surplus, but there were so many other men with higher priorities that he still had to wait his turn.¹² The motivation of Congressmen in pursuing this line was best summed up by Congressman Dewey Short of Missouri when he said:

I think a lot of us are demagoging and taking advantage of a critical situation here in a perilous time, absolutely because we know it is popular back home.¹³

Despite the basic soundness of the War Department plan, by late September continuing pressure for the early release of servicemen called for some kind of response.

If anyone in the War Department still had any hope of holding the line against the rising pressure, those hopes were dashed by a statement issued by General MacArthur on 17 September 1945. In his statement, which was made without prior co-ordination with either the Department of State or the War Department, MacArthur said that as a consequence of the "smooth progress" of the occupation of Japan a "drastic cut" in the number of troops originally estimated as needed for the Far East could be made.¹⁴ MacArthur claimed that he needed only 200,000 men, not the 500,000 that the War Department called for.¹⁵ This contradiction of policy by a field commander provided ammunition for the

¹²Ibid., pp. 215-20.

¹³U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 17 September 1945, Congressional Record 91: 8632.

¹⁴Sparrow, Demobilization, p. 351.

¹⁵Lee, "Mutiny 1946," p. 557.

political opposition who believed that the War Department's goal of a 2,500,000 man army was "entirely too high."¹⁶ According to the editors of Time magazine, when MacArthur issued this statement "the pot boiled." They went on to say that "In this situation there was only one thing for the Army to do."¹⁷ This was to call on the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall to explain.

Marshall addressed 350 Congressmen at a briefing on 20 September 1945.¹⁸ The Chief of Staff decided to give a "general perspective of what had occurred since Germany surrendered," so that the Congressmen could better understand the present situation.¹⁹ He explained that the Army had begun its demobilization with the surrender of Germany by requiring a Critical Score of eighty-five points to be considered eligible for discharge.²⁰ Each soldier was to be awarded points based on four factors: one point for each month served overseas during the same period; five points for the first and each additional award of selected decorations including medals from the Department of the Navy and accepted foreign governments; and finally twelve points for each

¹⁶U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 17 September 1945, Congressional Record 91: 8637.

¹⁷"Send Them Home," Time 46 (1 October 1945): 25.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹U.S., Congress, Senate, Demobilization of the Army, Remarks by George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, made to Members of Congress, 20 September 1945, S. Doc. 90, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, p. 1. (Hereinafter referred to as Marshall, S. Doc. 90.)

²⁰Ibid., p. 4.

child under eighteen up to a limit of three children.²¹

Marshall explained in detail how plans had been made to shift seventeen divisions of short service troops from Europe to the Pacific. This operation was underway when Japan surrendered earlier than expected. The new problem was that, "The pipe line was full, the ships were loaded or loading, and low-score Pacific troops were in all the staging areas. But the men now suddenly to be given first priority were back in Germany."²² Thus some low score men returned from Europe before some long service combat troops, and long service support troops in the United States with low scores were not eligible to be discharged unless two conditions were met. They had to be declared surplus by their immediate commanders and excess capacity had to be available at the discharge centers.²³ If capacity outstripped demand at the discharge centers, Marshall said, "then we can release from the service every man for whom we cannot find useful employment."²⁴ Since most of the hostile mail resulted from uncertainty in the discharge schedule Marshall announced that the critical score would be lowered to seventy points on 1 October and sixty points on 1 November. His hope was that this would give individuals the date when they would be eligible two months in advance.²⁵

²¹U.S., War Department, Statement by the Secretary of War on War Department Mobilization Plan, Press Release 10 May 1945, reprinted in Sparrow, Demobilization, pp. 311-16.

²²Marshall, S. Doc 90, p. 6.

²³Ibid., p. 8.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., p. 9.

Unfortunately Marshall's announcement led men to confuse their eligible date for release with their actual date. By raising expectations in this way only to have them frustrated soon afterwards, General Marshall inadvertently contributed to the intensity of the complaints. At the time, however, the "sad eyed" General was extremely effective in quieting the clamor. At the end of his briefing "there was not a single question" and "The pressure went down, visibly."²⁶ General Marshall repeated one important point several times; this was that the rate of demobilization would be determined by transportation facilities and by the availability of trained personnel to process discharges administratively. He stressed the point that "It has no relationship whatsoever to the size of the Army in the future."²⁷ If the planned rate of demobilization were adhered to, he did not feel that the question of the future size of the Army would come up until the spring of 1946.²⁸

In the event, General Marshall's plan was not carried to its logical conclusion. On 16 November, after another flood of letters from irate citizens, the War Department announced that on 1 December the points would be reduced to fifty-five.²⁹ The score was cut again on 19 December to fifty.³⁰ By the end of December General Marshall's plan had been vastly exceeded.

²⁶"Send Them Home," Time 46 (1 October 1945): 25.

²⁷Marshall, S. Doc 90, p. 1, also p. 12.

²⁸Ibid., p. 1.

²⁹New York Times, 17 November 1945, p. 10.

³⁰Ibid., 20 December 1945, p. 15.

Overall 1,665,000 more men were discharged than he had anticipated on 20 September.³¹ This speed up, however, advanced the time when interference between the objectives of demobilization and the need to establish the size of the postwar Army became acute.³²

The problem of determining the size of the force needed to meet postwar commitments had been put off for several reasons. First, the uncertainty of the requirements made any hard figure the object of harsh criticism. As late as 23 November 1945, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War wrote, "We have uncertainties in regard to our international commitments." He went on to reduce his first estimate of 1,950,000 to 1,600,000 man force for 1 July 1946. He claimed that this was "as firm as we can make it at the present time."³³ This estimate was cut again to 1,550,000 and on 15 January Eisenhower, who had taken over as Chief of Staff on 19 November 1945 announced a plan for 1,500,000.³⁴ By March the proposed estimate was lowered again to 1,070,000.³⁵

³¹Hearings, S. 1355, 3, p. 340; also printed in U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 17 January 1946, Congressional Record 92: A91-97.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 341.

³³Patterson memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 23 November 1945, Robert Porter Patterson Papers, Box 26, Letters Vol. V, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (Hereinafter referred to as Patterson Papers.)

³⁴Robert P. Patterson, *Diary of Trip Around the World* 30 December 1945 - 25 January 1946, entry for 14 January 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI.

³⁵Patterson to B. G. Julius Adler, 14 March 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI.

In addition to the pressure for demobilization, other factors contributed to the public criticism of the proposal for a large standing force. In light of the recently demonstrated power of atomic weapons, a mass ground force of the World War II pattern seemed almost irrelevant to the Communist challenge.³⁶ This sentiment was succinctly summed up in a statement submitted to a Senate Committee by Charles C. Rohrer:

We all recognize the next war will be won by the nation which has the latest in scientific achievements. Masses of foot soldiers can no longer compete with the atomic bombs.³⁷

Later, before the same committee Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle outlined the kind of force that became popular with both the public and budget analysts. Doolittle claimed that a "small, but adequate, ultramodern, highly mobile" establishment built around air power was the most economical defense organization for the U.S.³⁸ War Department plans for a large postwar force met with opposition which accused the generals of preparing for the last war.

By the end of 1945 the combined pressures on the War Department had created a situation where the nation would literally have "run out of Army" if the rate of demobilization had continued.³⁹ These pressures fell under several broad headings. One stemmed from the traditional American desire for rapid demobilization. Pressure from this source was greater than after any other war in U.S.

³⁶Wiegley, History of the United States Army, p. 501.

³⁷Hearings, S. 1355, 1-2, p. 129.

³⁸"Doolittle v. the Navy," Time 46 (19 November 1946): 25.

³⁹Hearings, S. 1355, 3, p. 341.

History. This was the result of several unprecedented developments peculiar to the post 1945 period. The unequalled size of World War II forces and the duration of commitment contributed to this. Another new factor was the vast geographical area over which the combat forces were spread at the end of the war. Never before had the United States faced such extensive demands for troops to perform occupational duties.⁴⁰ Moreover, great progress in mass communications had made public opinion more articulate than after any previous war.⁴¹ In addition to all of these developments, the onset of the nuclear age caused all previous assumptions about defense to be reevaluated. Despite the growing awareness in the administration concerning the Soviet menace, the continuous reduction of estimated requirements for military manpower appears to have been more a reaction to domestic pressure than a reasoned response to the international threat.

By 4 January 1946 the War Department had determined that further concessions to popular pressure would seriously undermine national security. On this date an official press release announced that there would be a slowdown in demobilization.⁴² The reaction to this announcement had reached violent levels when an

⁴⁰After World War I only one U.S. Regiment was involved as part of the occupation force, see Marshall, S. Doc. 90, p. 8.

⁴¹Patterson to Dr. Douglass S. Freeman, 6 June 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI.

⁴²U.S., War Department, Troop Requirements Govern Rate of Overseas Demobilization, Press Release 4 January 1946; reprinted in Sparrow, Demobilization, pp. 320-21.

unfortunate comment by the Secretary of War hit the press on 6 January.

In many respects Robert Porter Patterson had the ideal background to prepare him for his duties as Secretary of War. He received the LL.B. degree summa cum laude in 1915 from Harvard Law School. He held the prestigious position of president of the Harvard Law Review in his last year. After passing the bar he enlisted as a private in the New York National Guard. In this capacity he served on the Mexican border for six months in 1916. In 1917 he was commissioned a second lieutenant, was trained at Plattsburg and sailed for France in April of 1918. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross as a company commander for heroism in action. He also received the Purple Heart after he was wounded in August 1918. Promoted to major in 1919, he was mustered out of the army and returned to his law practice. Appointed United States District Judge in 1930 for the southern district of New York, he served until President Roosevelt named him a judge of the United States circuit court of appeals. His subordinates in the War Department and members of Congress continued to refer to him as "the Judge" throughout his service there. In July 1940 he was appointed Assistant Secretary of War and in December 1940 to the newly created post of Undersecretary of War. President Truman named Patterson Secretary of War on 26 September 1945 when Henry L. Stimson resigned. Judge Patterson assumed his new duties just in time to encounter the severest criticism of demobilization.⁴³

⁴³Robert I. Vexler, The Vice-Presidents and Cabinet Members: Biographies Arranged Chronologically by Administration, 2 vols.

Patterson made the comment which was to prove so unfortunate during an around the world inspection tour which began five days before the demobilization slowdown. At press conferences in Hawaii and in Guam he was quoted as saying he didn't know that an enlisted man's points for discharged had stopped accumulating on V-J Day.⁴⁴ Different accounts of the incident suggest that his reply was interpreted incorrectly or simply that he should have been more familiar with the program.⁴⁵ The Secretary explained in his diary entry for 6 January what really had happened.

My attention was called to article in Stars and Stripes, to effect that in press interview at Guam I was 'completely surprised' that point scores had not accumulated since V-J day. There had been an informal press conference at Guam, just after the review of the work of 20th Air Force. I had known that points did not continue to mount up after V-J day, but had forgotten it and in a talk or discussion of points I did say that men overseas were getting two points a month. On being corrected I readily agreed that such was not the case

He went on to explain that he had not considered the incident significant and was surprised that Stars and Strips thought it worth repeating. Then he added,

It may cause trouble . . . The Stars and Stripes here is on the rampage against Army authority and is prone to make a

(Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Pub., Inc., 1975), Vol. 2, pp. 637-39; Eleanor W. Schoenebaum, Political Profiles: The Truman Years (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1978), Vol. 1, pp. 431-33; "Interim Appointment," Time 46 (1 October 1945): 25.

⁴⁴The story was written by a Stars and Stripes reporter and was widely disseminated by major press associations. It appeared in the Pacific edition of Stars and Stripes, 6 January 1946; New York Times, 7 January 1946, pp. 1, 5.

⁴⁵Sparrow, Demobilization, p. 162; Lee, "Mutiny 1946," p. 562.

sensation out of trivial incidents.⁴⁶

This last note proved prescient.

The unfortunate incident coupled with a recent announcement concerning the slowdown of demobilization caused a violent reaction. Major demonstrations were held by disappointed soldiers around the world. The most serious occurred in Manila where crowds variously estimated from 8,000 to 20,000 marched in protest.⁴⁷ Signs were carried referring to the secretary's comment including one which read "Yamashita Patterson They Didn't Know."⁴⁸ Other demonstrations took place in Paris, London, Frankfurt and even Dayton, Ohio.⁴⁹ Soldiers sent cablegrams signed by as many as 6,000 of their compatriots to newspaper columnists Walter Winchell and Drew Pearson.⁵⁰ Others wrote directly to their Congressmen calling for them to "Either Demobilize us or when given the next shot at the ballot box, we will demobilize you."⁵¹ One sergeant in Osaka bluntly cabled

⁴⁶Patterson Diary, entry for 6 January 1945, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI.

⁴⁷Sparrow, Demobilization, p. 164; Lee, "Mutiny 1946," p. 562.

⁴⁸From photograph in Time 47 (21 January 1946): 20; General Tomoyaki Yamashita was tried for "war crimes" committed by his subordinates in the Fourteenth Army Group in the Philippine Islands during the three years of Japanese occupation. Yamashita pleaded in defense that he was unaware of the abuses. The tribunal refused to accept this as an excuse and he was executed. See A. Frank Reel, The Case of General Yamashita (Chicago: University Press, 1949).

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰New York Times, 9 January 1946, p. 6.

⁵¹U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 29 January 1946, Congressional Record 92: A327.

President Truman: "Give us our independent or go lack to yours."⁵² Numerous telegrams protesting the "vacillation and arbitrary" actions of the War Department were sent to the White House.⁵³ Unfortunately some of these accusations were true.

One newspaper clipping from the Pacific that many soldiers mailed to their Congressmen clearly indicates that the War Department had done a very poor job of handling the public relations problems associated with demobilization. The letter, in part, reads as follows:

Sir: Following is a list of false statements, mere morale builders, and finally absurdities, handed out through the courtesy of the War Department. As the late Al Smith once said, 'Let's take a look at the record.'

September 22: Point scores announced: October, 70; November, 60; and after that 2 - year men.

September 25: No 36-point enlisted men, or 48-point officers will be sent overseas.

October 20: Army must reduce points to keep pace with demobilization.

October 21: War Department reaffirms release target dates.

October 24: Homeward sailings lag behind goal.

November 20: Pacific based returnees promised relief as transport surplus booms in January.

December 5, 9, 12, 15: Bright prospects on shipping as backlog breaks.

December 21: 50 points good December 31.

December 28: All troops not needed to go home by March 1, says War Secretary Patterson.

January 3: Sixty-eight thousand more berths assigned to AFWESPAC [Army Forces Western Pacific].

January 5: War Secretary Patterson is reported 'completely surprised' by certain facts on demobilization set-up.'

January 5: Army announces demobilization will be slowed down and the return rate of some troops delayed.⁵⁴

⁵²Telegram to President Truman quoted in Lee, "Mutiny 1946," p. 563.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 15 January 1946, Congressional Record 92: 22-23; also printed at Ibid., A43-44.

One can easily sympathize with soldiers on far-flung islands who have their expectations raised by overly optimistic press releases only to have them dashed almost immediately. The most regrettable aspect of the whole situation was that the army was way ahead of the goals that General Marshall had set back in September. The problem was how to communicate this to the public.

Once again the solution was to have a widely respected military leader speak directly to the Congress. On 10 January Acting Secretary of War (while Patterson was on his inspection tour) Kenneth C. Royall came to this conclusion and suggested to the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Demobilization that General Eisenhower appear before Congress and explain the discharge situation in detail "much in the same manner that General Marshall did . . ."⁵⁵

In a series of appearances General Eisenhower effectively set the record straight on demobilization. On 15 January he appeared before the members of Congress and presented a detailed account of Army manpower requirements. He admitted that some optimistic War Department estimates could not be met.⁵⁶ On the other hand he clearly pointed out that the Army was way ahead of its demobilization schedule and thus had to slow down earlier than had been previously estimated.⁵⁷ The Chief of Staff indicated his awareness of the problem of unfulfilled expectations when he said, "The very stepping up of these returning shipments

⁵⁵Hearings, S. 1355, 3, p. 253.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 340, 349.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 340.

undoubtedly helped to create confusion by stimulating optimism among servicemen and their families."⁵⁸ The largest part of his speech presented a detailed breakdown of exactly what the troops were doing in the occupied areas.⁵⁹ Finally, he cleared up the main source of frustration by explaining the discrepancy between eligible date and actual departure date.⁶⁰ Two days later the General appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Demobilization to clarify his remarks and answer questions.

General Eisenhower's explanations and plan, along with several other factors combined to diminish the voluminous criticism of early January. His speech was well received by Congressmen who were eager to get the same information out to their constituents.⁶¹ The press was more critical of Congressmen "with eyes cocked at the political heavens" than with able strategist "Ike Eisenhower."⁶² The fact that over 5,000,000 men had already been discharged and that the peak months had passed also probably helped to reduce the clamor since there were simply fewer people left to complain.⁶³ As the criticism over demobilization

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 342-48.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 350.

⁶¹U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 15 January 1946, Congressional Record 92: 20.

⁶²For examples of favorable press coverage see "Operation Eisenhower," Time 47 (28 January 1946): 24; New York Times, 16 January 1946, p. 2. This article reads in part, "His [Eisenhower's] explanation of why it was necessary to slow down the rate of demobilization is reasonable, explicit and should be accepted. We believe it will be, by the people and by the soldiers, if not by some members of Congress."

⁶³Hearings, S. 1355, 3, p. 340.

reached its peak in early January and began to subside, public attention gradually shifted to other unpopular practices in the Army.

The question of how to man the postwar army was debated almost from the beginning of the demobilization controversy. Volunteer recruitment was favorably considered by most since a large influx of volunteers would provide replacements for men already overseas and thus expedite demobilization.⁶⁴ The problem that appeared in January 1946 was that the number of volunteers plus the diminishing numbers brought in under selective service proved not to be enough to meet the Army's stated goal of 1,500,000 by July 1946.⁶⁵ War Department officials were being pressured from all sides. They were smarting under the recent outcry against the demobilization slowdown on the one hand and on the other uncertain that selective service would even be continued when it came up for renewal in the spring of 1946.⁶⁶ Under these circumstances their only recourse was to devise some way to increase the number of volunteers. To make the service more attractive to prospective recruits and to respond to the second wave of postwar public criticism the War Department was

⁶⁴This reason was used to support the volunteer force bill H.S. 3951 for example see U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 17 September 1945, Congressional Record 91: 8636.

⁶⁵Hearings, S. 1355, 3, p. 351: The reduction in the number of conscripts has been attributed to the Selective Service board's policy of making physical standards for draftees more rigid than during the war. Another reason was that deferments were easier to get, see Lee, "Mutiny 1946," p. 562.

⁶⁶Concerning the uncertainty of extension for selective service see "Waiting," Time 47 (25 March 1946): 25.

forced to reevaluate some of its internal practices that were considered objectionable by former and presumably future soldiers.

When Secretary of War Patterson returned from his around the world inspection tour on 25 January 1946 he was understandably rather sensitive to public relations problems. He sent a memorandum on 31 January to General J. Lawton Collins who at that time was serving as the Chief of Information of the War Department in charge of public relations functions. Patterson got directly to the point,

I believe that the three most critical issues that confront the Army today are:

1. The required strength of the Army with the problem of recruiting and replacements.
2. Occupation, duties and responsibilities.
3. Surplus property, particularly overseas.

I should like to have prepared a study and a comprehensive publicity plan which will place the War Department views on these issues before the public and the soldiers in the most convincing way. I hope that the plan can be submitted to me for consideration by February 12th.⁶⁷

The identification of these problems by the Secretary suggest that, despite his recent troubles with the press, or perhaps because of them he was acutely aware of the public relations problem the Army now faced.

During the period of transition when demobilization began to decline as a major issue, two other army practices started to attract increasing criticism. The first of these was a reaction against the officer corps or the so-called "caste system." Throughout the demobilization debates numerous critics had

⁶⁷Patterson memorandum for General J. Lawton Collins, 31 January 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 21, file "P" Miscellany.

accused "the brass" of slowing the discharge rate so that they could keep up the size of the army and thus enhance their own power and prestige.⁶⁸ This charge received such widespread dissemination that General Eisenhower felt it necessary to bring it up in his 15 January address.⁶⁹ The close bonds that had been formed between officers and their men in combat were gradually loosened by the return to formal protocol during long months of occupation duty. In many cases the strong emotional ties forged in the heat of combat were severed completely by the rotation out of high point men. Along with this trend, the increased opportunity for officers to take advantage of social privileges in the occupational forces--opportunities that had scarcely existed among combat units during the war--now led to more widespread abuse and as a result, more public criticism.⁷⁰

The second major practice that began to receive more critical attention was the Army court-martial system. Many critics apparently considered this part of the caste system problem since officers and men were treated differently both by statute and in practice before the law. Others saw it as a special problem

⁶⁸High ranking officers were repeatedly accused of slowing demobilization in order to keep their soldiers and thus maintain their commands and the associated power and prestige. For example see U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 14 November 1945, Congressional Record 91: A4883-84; Hearings S. 1355, 1-2, p. 129.

⁶⁹Hearings S. 1355, 3, p. 350.

⁷⁰A rough appreciation of the peak period for this criticism may be gleaned from a simple analysis of twenty-one periodical articles used as source material by the Doolittle Board. Grouped by month of publication the frequency of appearance is as follows: Dec--2; Jan--2; Feb--7; Mar--4; Apr--4; May--2.

that should be investigated and dealt with separately. The Secretary of War agreed with the latter group and was always careful to differentiate between the two problems. For example, in a personal letter to an ex-army lawyer, Patterson asked Colonel Edward Hemphill to prepare a memorandum outlining his impressions of the wartime court-martial system and a separate memorandum concerning the complaints of enlisted-men.⁷¹ Regardless of the relationship between the two problems, the passage of a resolution in the Senate authorizing an investigation of the court-martial systems of both the Army and Navy on 29 January 1946 suggests that this issue was receiving more attention from both Congress and the public.⁷²

On 13 February, the day after the publicity plan called for by the Secretary of War was to be delivered, Patterson and Collins discussed future War Department public relations policy. Collins apparently included in his plan a suggestion to form "a board to go into complaints of enlisted men."⁷³ In a memorandum

⁷¹Patterson to Col. Edward S. Hemphill, 20 February 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI; other evidence to support this is that Patterson appointed separate boards to look at the two problems.

⁷²Ibid., U.S., Congress, Senate, Authorizing an Investigation of the Administration of Martial Law in the Territory of Hawaii Subsequent to December 7, 1941. (This also authorized an investigation of the Army and Navy court-martial systems), S. Rept. 903 to Accompany S. Res. 216, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, p. 1.

⁷³Patterson memorandum for General J. Lawton Collins, 14 February 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 21, file "P" Miscellany, the memo reads in part, "In reference to the matter we discussed yesterday 13 Feb about a board to go into complaints of enlisted men . . ." I was unable to find a copy of the publicity plan that Patterson requested for 12 February. An interview with General J. Lawton Collins, Washington, D.C., 11 March 1983, did not help. General Collins is now 86 and does not remember the plan.

to Collins the following day Patterson offered some first hand observations from his son who had served in the Army Air Corps. The memo corroborated the need for such a board and gives some clue as to what the Secretary had in mind when he actually appointed such a board the following month. His son had been mustered out a captain and had just returned to Harvard to continue his studies. Based on his contact with ex-GIs at Harvard he noted that "The enlisted man returnee is very bitter about the Army." He pointed out that if the Army did not institute some internal reforms then "forces intolerant of them would reduce [the Army's] status to absurdity." He concludes by recommending that "It would be better if the War Department conducted a survey, weighed the results and then made several large changes. They would at least do no harm and without a doubt would result in a larger standing Army for defense."⁷⁴ It is difficult to determine how much of an effect this letter had on the Secretary's intentions concerning a board to consider enlisted men's complaints. It is more difficult to deny, however, that certain similarities exist between his son's suggestions and the actual Doolittle Board established the following month.

By March of 1946 demobilization had been overshadowed as the main source of criticism of the army. A Bureau of Public Relations Report listed nine subjects "in the order of their immediacy and gravity as Army public relations problems."⁷⁵

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Brigadier General Joseph F. Battley, Acting Director Bureau of Public Relations, memorandum to Chief, Information Branch, 27 March 1946, "Report No. 1 on Subjects of Current Army

Demobilization was listed as number eight. The number one problem according to this report was the question of atomic energy control. While this was certainly a major issue since it was perceived as being a key to guaranteeing the Army's fair share of future budget allocations, it was not, however, a major source of public criticism nor did it require changes in fundamental army practices. Number two on the list was censorship of the service press, meaning media such as Stars and Stripes and Yank. This problem was apparently the hot item for that week because of an unfortunate decision by a theater commander. The problem was quickly resolved and had no effect on the army infrastructure.⁷⁶ Item numbers three and four referred to the "Caste" system and Military justice.⁷⁷ The assessment of the report concerning the status of demobilization as an issue contains some interesting analysis.

Criticism of the Army for its handling of demobilization virtually stopped during the first two weeks of March. In its place rose a new kind of criticism, or rather complaint, directed against no agency in particular, but rather against the suddenly recognized fact that speedy demobilization, so recently demanded, had emasculated the country's armed forces to a serious extent.⁷⁸

Public Relations Problems," Modern Military Division, Morale Services Activities decimal file SPMS 330.11, Box 374, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as NA, SPMS 330.11).

⁷⁶New York Times, 18 March 1946, p. 4; Ibid., 20 March 1946, p. 12.

⁷⁷Battley memorandum to Chief of Information Branch, 27 March 1946, "Current Army Public Relations Problems," NA, SPMS 330.11, Box 374.

⁷⁸Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE DOOLITTLE BOARD

Once War Secretary Patterson had decided to form a group to study the main sources of criticism directed at the Army, he then had to make a basic decision concerning the objectives of the panel. Before specific appointments could be made one fundamental question had to be answered. Did the Secretary really want expert advice on which to base sweeping changes aimed at eliminating the root cause of the problem? Or did he want a group to study the problem with much fanfare and publicity and thus act as a placebo that would serve to divert criticism from the War Department which might otherwise bring undesirable statutory changes? Such tactics, if skillfully handled, would help fend off the current outcry and deflect the critics towards peripheral issues that would have little or no effect on the basic structure of the Army. A decision on this basic issue would provide the essential criteria for determining the most desirable qualifications of the members. Clearly the alternatives required different kinds of people to optimize their intended effect.

If the Secretary really wanted to seek advice upon which to base significant changes in the system then it followed that individuals appointed to the proposed board should be chosen for

this purpose. Since the War Department would eventually apply the findings of such a panel, qualified experts in the field should obviously be selected. These men would not necessarily have to be widely known popular figures. The only criterion for prospective appointees to this kind of board would be that they be accredited in their fields and sufficiently experienced to insure sound judgment. Another guideline for such a board would stress greater concern for an in depth analysis designed to get the facts than for the speedy publication of a final report to placate some strident critics. Findings based on hastily obtained data might call for extensive and even costly modifications that could easily turn out to be both difficult and expensive to undo if it subsequently turned out that they had been based on false analysis.

The members of a board designed to serve as a "heat sink" for public criticism would require markedly different credentials from one aimed at substantive reform. For greatest impact candidates for this kind of board should have recognizable "household" names and represent the widest possible spectrum of interest groups that would be affected by proposed changes. To gain the confidence of the press and public appointees for this kind of board should ideally appear to be independent and unbiased. But this requirement would have to be balanced against the appointing agency's need for a certain amount of control over the recommendations of the group. This is a critical consideration since the ramifications of failure on this point could produce cries of "whitewash" on the one hand or, on the other, unpalatable recommendations that could not be vetoed without a flurry of

criticism--perhaps worse than the clamor which the board was designed to counter in the first place. The time factor is more important with this type of board, since its primary purpose would be to stem violent public criticism that could lead to congressional inquiry and even to radical changes that might seriously threaten the functional needs of the military establishment. Numerous examples exist of committees appointed with the sincere objective of providing advice to hard pressed administrators. On the other hand, while they are sometimes more difficult to discern, many studies have been appointed with the primary purpose of parrying public, media and Congressional criticism.¹

Examples of study groups appointed to placate public criticism can be cited from periods both before and after the post World War II era. For example, when faced with growing public criticism of the military draft in 1966, President Lyndon Johnson appointed the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service to investigate and make recommendations. Since the purpose of the group was to lend its prestige to the administration's plans to reform the draft, only persons known to favor it were appointed. The panel consisted of an impressive array of talented and influential persons representing many of the interest groups concerned.² Three years later President Richard Nixon used the

¹For example, consider the Technical Capabilities Panel set up in 1954 under the leadership of James R. Killian, Jr. or the President's Science Advisory Committee which replaced it after Sputnik.

²John Whiteclay Chambers, II, Draftees or Volunteers: A Documentary History of the Debate Over Military Conscription in the United States, 1787-1973 (New York: Gasland Publishing, Inc., 1975), p. 440.

same ploy to relieve immediate pressure for action and to build long range support for major draft reform. This panel, popularly known as the Gates Commission, again contained many well known people representing a wide variety of interest groups. It was clearly designed to lend prestige and support to the administration's chosen policy because only people known to favor a return to an all-volunteer armed forces were appointed.³

An example of a committee convened in response to great public outcry before the post World War II era is the Dodge Commission of 1898-1899 appointed to investigate Army failures in the Spanish-American War. President William McKinley made it clear to the members that their purpose was not to provide recommendations aimed at reform and reorganization but rather to find a few scapegoats and thus appease the electorate.⁴ McKinley failed in his purpose since the report satisfied neither the public nor the press.⁵ His most glaring error was his failure to establish the necessary balance between the appearance of unbiased independence and informal control. The widely respected General John M. Schofield pointed out to McKinley that the scope of his proposed board would not "satisfy the public demand" or make evident "what legislation is necessary to remedy the defects in our military system."⁶ He suspected that the commission was

³Ibid., p. 448.

⁴Barrie Emert Zais, "The Struggle for a 20th Century Army: Investigation and Reform of the United States Army After the Spanish-American War, 1898-1903" (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1981), p. 448.

⁵Ibid., p. 213.

⁶Ibid., Schofield quoted in pp. 167-68.

a political maneuver and would have no part of it.⁷ Evidently the press agreed with General Schofield because they branded the undertaking as a "whitewash" as well as an "Alger Relief Commission" even before the appointees met.⁸ In the end the commission refused to single out guilty individuals and thus failed to accomplish the President's purpose. Moreover the report failed to effect any real reforms since McKinley never endorsed the document.⁹

Before returning to the problem of post World War II criticism consider two examples which point out several other facets of the strategy of appointing boards. During a whole series of boards and committees convened during the 1920's and 30's by both Congress and the President to investigate and make recommendations on the future role of the Army Air Corps, some lessons were learned that were put to use again after World War II. The House Military Affairs Committee convened a sub-committee headed by Representative W. N. Rogers of New Hampshire in March of 1934. The chairman may have recalled that an earlier study had suffered from an unscrupulous use of its published hearings as a sounding board for disgruntled claimants against the government. When the Chief of the Air Corps requested that the testimony be

⁷Ibid., p. 168.

⁸Ibid., p. 175; "Alger relief commission" referred to Secretary of War Russell A. Alger who was blamed by the press and even by many military men, for all the problems encountered by the War Department during the war. "Algerism" became a journalistic term symbolizing all the blunders of the war, Ibid., p. 129. If Alger were exonerated, the Republicans stood to gain in the off-year elections two months later, Ibid., p. 176.

⁹Ibid., pp. 214-15.

heard in executive session he and his committee obligingly complied.¹⁰ The chairman decided that the press coverage that would indicate to the public that something was being done was less important than the possible loss of respectability if the committee became a forum for political speeches. This is another aspect of investigative committees that must be considered by appointing authorities.

Later in 1934, when a series of military aircraft crashes caused a new public uproar it became evident that the Army Air Corps would be investigated by a number of congressional groups, raising the specter of different and perhaps conflicting recommendations. To counter this possibility the Secretary of War decided to act. The official history of the period explained the Secretary's decision:

Following the traditional pattern of parrying congressional investigators with Executive appointees, the Secretary beat Congress to the draw in April 1934 by establishing a board under the chairmanship of former Secretary of War Baker¹¹

The board was apparently weighted in favor of a conservative solution consistent with the General Staff's view of air power.¹² One of the civilian members of the board had been appointed because of his reputation as a nationally recognized "popular

¹⁰Stetson Conn, gen. ed., United States Army in World War II: Special Studies, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. 7: Buying Aircraft: Material Procurement For the Army Air Forces, by Irving Brinton Holley, Jr., p. 124.

¹¹Ibid., p. 56.

¹²Ibid.

figure with whom non-aviation people readily identified."¹³ Since he was obviously appointed to the board to lend his prestige rather than to support the conservative War Department view, the fact that he presented a minority statement as the lone dissenter was not surprising.¹⁴ James Harold Doolittle apparently had not been let in on the fact that the main purpose of the Baker Board was to reaffirm and give public support to the position of the War Department rather than to recommend sweeping changes to the status of the air weapon. His experience with this board and other air power studies of the 1930's almost certainly gave him a clearer understanding of the political process when he next lent his prestige to a War Department investigation prompted by public criticism after World War II.

By the latter part of February 1946 despite the fact that the clamor over demobilization was on the decline, Secretary of War Patterson was bracing himself for another wave of public protest. In a letter to Sherman Minton, who had been involved with initiating the postwar Army clemency board involved with reviewing excessively severe court-martial sentences, Patterson expressed his concern for the immediate future.

According to all signs we are in for a period of reaction, where everything that the Army did in the last five years was wrong and stupid. It was that way after the last war,

¹³Barrett Tillman, "Jimmy Doolittle: The First 80 Years," American Aviation Historical Society Journal 21 (Winter 1976): 229.

¹⁴Carroll V. Glines, Jimmy Doolittle: Daredevil Aviator and Scientist (New York: Macmillan Co., 1972), pp. 116-17; Lowell Thomas and Edward Jablonski, Doolittle: A Biography (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1976), pp. 134-36.

and it will be worse this time because this was a longer and a harder war. The debunkers will have their way in books, magazines, and newspapers, and anyone who reminds them that after all we won the war will just be a sap.¹⁵

That same day he wrote another letter stating essentially the same thing but adding that,

. . . deficiencies that were really minor in character will take on great importance. This condition will finally adjust itself, but a good deal of damage will be done meanwhile.¹⁶

The rising clamor of public criticism caused the Secretary to change his views on how the War Department should respond.

As the criticism of the military increased throughout February 1946 Patterson's opinion of the need for careful consideration when dealing with the press began to change. His surprise over the way the media had blown up his misunderstanding about discharge points in January suggests a certain lack of familiarity on his part in dealing with the press. In his correspondence Patterson admitted that he had not sensed the importance of public relations when he was a practicing lawyer. Realizing his error, he began to take an interest in the Army School of Information, which had recently been established at Carlisle Barracks, where regular army personnel were to be trained in public relations techniques.¹⁷ By early summer he was aware of yet another reason for the intensity of the post World War II outcry. "It [the criticism] seems somewhat more severe this time, a

¹⁵Patterson to Honorable Sherman Minton, 23 February 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI.

¹⁶Patterson to Honorable James W. Gerard, 23 February 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI.

¹⁷Ibid.

development that may be attributed, I presume, to the vastly expended media of communication of ideas in this age."¹⁸

While Patterson was revising his methods for dealing with the media the senior Army officer responsible for relations with the press furthered his plans to defuse the officer-enlisted relations problem. After recommending on 12 February that a board be appointed as part of a publicity plan, Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins next looked for support from the United States Military Academy at West Point. During a visit to the Academy he suggested to the new Superintendent, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, that they produce "something at West Point on officer-enlisted man relations."¹⁹ Taylor produced a "Creed" in rough draft stressing an officer's responsibility to his men. He indicated that once finalized he would have it reproduced in "a suitable artistic manner and enclose a copy with the diploma to each graduating cadet."²⁰ While this idea was still in the planning stages he told Collins that, "the 'Creed' would be available . . . for such Public Relations uses as you might desire."²¹ While Collins was marshalling his forces, Patterson refined his

¹⁸Patterson to Dr. Douglas S. Freeman, 6 June 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI.

¹⁹Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (Superintendent USMA) to Lieut. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, 20 February 1946, NA, SPMS 330.11, Box 374.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.; Collins forwarded the draft "creed" to the Director of Information and Education Brig. Gen. Lanham for refinement. Lanham said he did not have the time, people or inspiration to produce a proper creed. He suggested that the West Point English Department work on it. See Lanham memorandum for Gen. Collins, 18 March 1946, NA, SPMS 330.11.

concept of what the proposed board should consider.

As the storm of protest against War Department policies gathered momentum during February, an article appeared that gave Patterson an idea on how to contain the major topic of complaint. The article entitled "What's Wrong with Our Army?" by Robert Neville appeared in the 25 February edition of Life magazine. Neville, former editor of the Mediterranean version of the Stars and Stripes, argued that while soldiers gripe about all sorts of trivial dislikes, the "one fundamental reason for the average American's strong distastes for military service is the continued existence of the Army's caste system."²² He cited as evidence a host of objectionable practices including: officers restaurants, hotels, nightclubs and bars; "Off Limits to Enlisted Men" and "For Officers Only" signs; separate post exchanges, access to better female company, extra liquor rations, reserved seats at theaters, separate hospital wards and even separate latrines.²³ He concluded that until the Army changed its practices "despite lures of pay, travel and vacations, relatively few men in this free country of ours will elect to enter a caste-ridden organization in which they immediately become the untouchables."²⁴ Neville's clear presentation backed up with extensive examples gave Patterson an idea on how to proceed. After reading the article he fired off a memorandum to Gen. Collins.

²²Robert Neville, "What's Wrong With Our Army?," Life 20 (25 February 1946): 105.

²³Ibid., pp. 105-06, 108.

²⁴Ibid., p. 112.

This article is the soundest one on officer-enlisted man relationships that I have seen. It would be relatively easy to remedy most of these conditions, without any damage to discipline.

I should like to discuss the article with you.²⁵

It appears that Patterson now believed that he could convene a board, hold hearings to satisfy the public that something was being done and then agree to the board's recommendations since they would not involve fundamental changes in Army procedure. Further evidence that supports this assertion appeared in his correspondence five days later. In response to a letter complaining about the inequalities of the caste system he wrote,

I assure you that corrective measures will be taken. These practices can be abolished without in any way disturbing the discipline of the various commands and without affecting the soundness of the structure as a whole.²⁶

With a firm concept now in mind the Secretary moved rapidly to implement his plan.

Since officer-enlisted relations fell under the purview of the Army personnel officer (G-1) his office was assigned the task of organizing the Secretary's proposed board. On 5 March Major Wilson R. G. Bender was detailed by the G-1 from the Office of the Adjutant General to serve as the board recorder.²⁷ The

²⁵Patterson memorandum for General J. Lawton Collins, 24 February 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 21, file "O" Miscellany.

²⁶Patterson to Mr. LeRoy M. Edwards of Pacific Lighting Corporation, 1 March 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI.

²⁷Maj. W. R. G. Bender, "Daily Diary," 5 March 1946, Modern Military Divisions, War Department General Staff, G-1 (Personnel), Record Group 165, Entry 43, Box 522, Tab V, Washington National Records Center, Suitland Maryland (hereinafter referred to as G-1 file).

position of recorder proved to be second only to the board chairman in importance. Bender was the perfect man for the job. He was forty years old at the time, had received his B.A. in 1929, his M.S. in 1931, and his Ph.D. in psychology in 1932 from the State University of Iowa. He had transferred from the Civilian Conservation Corps to the Army in 1942 where he served in various personnel related jobs until 1946.²⁸ His scientific training proved useful in analyzing statistically the voluminous correspondence, testimony and other material presented to the board as evidence. Bender showed himself to be highly capable in the realm of public relations, was extremely hard working, articulate, and above all well organized.²⁹ Almost single handedly he tackled the task of organizing the board, establishing procedures, and providing all the necessary administrative support. His first task was to locate and invite the Secretary's proposed members to sit on the panel.

When Bender was first briefed by the G-1 on his assignment as the recorder he wrote down the six names of the proposed members of the board on the back of a 3x5 card.³⁰ All six of these candidates eventually served on the board. From the qualifications of each man one may divine what the Secretary intended when he convened the board at the end of March.

²⁸National Cyclopedia of American Biography (Clifton, N.J.: James T. White & Co., 1974), 55, p. 68.

²⁹All of these attributes are evident in the G-1 file. In particular see Major W. R. G. Bender, "Daily Diary," Box 522, Tab V; see also his extensive after action report Box 522, Tab I.

³⁰Bender, "Daily Diary," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, 5 March 1946. The card is the first document in the file.

Patterson's main concern when considering candidates was much the same as those of other executive study groups. He wanted men with well known names who could help the board establish public respectability based on their individual accomplishments. A wide cross section of army rank structure was also desirable. Since the criticism was directed at the officer corps, enlisted men and officers with enlisted experience would give the board an unbiased appearance.

Patterson established the basic criteria to be used in choosing the board members after "considerable discussion" with the Army Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower.³¹ In a letter to General Matthew B. Ridgway, who was serving as the Chief of Staff's representative to the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations, Eisenhower explained the qualifications that he and the Secretary of War had agreed on.

. . . we are contemplating the appointment of a board composed of two former enlisted men, two former company or field grade officers and two general officers--none of whom are now on active duty.³²

Evidently Patterson decided to invite the two ex-general officers personally to sit on the board while the other four members were contacted by Major Bender on 8 March.³³ While Bender was busy arranging for the junior members to appear, Patterson approached

³¹Eisenhower to Matthew B. Ridgway, 15 March 1946, Louis Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 9 vols. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), vol. VII: The Chief of Staff, pp. 933-34 (hereinafter referred to as Eisenhower Papers).

³²Ibid.

³³Bender, "Daily Diary," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, 8 March 1946.

his choice as chairman of the board, Lt. Gen. James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle, asking to meet with him on the 12th of March apparently to discuss what he hoped the board would accomplish.³⁴

Jimmy Doolittle spent his early boyhood in Nome, Alaska and later moved to Los Angeles with his mother. Because of his small size and girl-like curly hair he drew frequent challenges from bigger schoolmates and soon developed a reputation as a fierce competitor.³⁵ In 1912 at the age of fifteen he won the amateur bantam-weight championship of the West Coast.³⁶ When the United States entered World War I he promptly signed up for training as an Army aviator. Despite his desire to be sent overseas he was shipped around the States and finished out the war as an instructor pilot at Rockwell Field near San Diego.³⁷

Doolittle first came to national prominence when he made the first transcontinental crossing of the United States in less than twenty-four hours on 4 September 1922.³⁸ In 1925 he completed graduate study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was awarded the Doctor of Science in Aeronautics degree--

³⁴Patterson telegram to Doolittle, 8 March 1946, James H. Doolittle Papers, Box 14, Personal Papers-Military-1946 to 1955, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as Doolittle Papers).

³⁵Glines, Doolittle, pp. 12-13.

³⁶Ibid., p. 16.

³⁷Paul O'Neill and the editors of Time-Life Books, Barnstormers & Speed Kings, Epic of Flight Series (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1981), pp. 153-54.

³⁸Tillman, "Jimmy Doolittle: The First 80 Years," p. 298.

one of the first ever to be granted in the United States.³⁹ Later that same year he won the Schneider Cup Seaplane Race in a borrowed Navy airplane.⁴⁰ By 1927 his name was a household word and his public image was that of a devil-may-care stunt pilot. Despite his image, before each of his "stunts" Doolittle put in hours of careful calculation and practice that better fitted the scientist than the daredevil.⁴¹

Doolittle showed a flair for public relations very early in his career. In the spring of 1919 when a group of Army pilots from Rockwell Field flew from San Diego to New York and returned, Doolittle went to see his commanding officer with a better idea. The young pilot told the colonel that he did not think that the Army got the right kind of publicity out of the New York flight. He went on to elaborate on how the public relations value could have been increased.

. . . the trip didn't prove anything to the American public. If the flight had been from Rockwell Field to Bolling Field in Washington, D.C., it could have been publicized as proving that the airplane could be used as a fast army courier that could deliver secret messages from a far-flung installation to War Department headquarters in the nation's capital. That angle would give your command better nationwide publicity as well as bring credit to the army.⁴²

After he left the service in 1930 he went to work with the Shell Oil Company to exploit both his famous name and his ability to manage the press successfully.⁴³ He continued to build his

³⁹Glines, Doolittle, p. 59.

⁴⁰Tillman, "Jimmy Doolittle: The First 80 Years," p. 298.

⁴¹Glines, Doolittle, p. 75.

⁴²Doolittle quoted in *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

⁴³*Ibid.*, pp. 95, 100, 102.

reputation by winning the 1931 Bendix Race and a year later the prestigious Thompson Race.⁴⁴ His scientific training enabled him to make technical contributions to aviation such as the development of blind flying equipment and procedures and he played a crucial role in getting Shell to produce high-octane fuel.⁴⁵ Both of these contributions had tremendous impact on the future. When war appeared imminent he returned to active duty with the reserve rank of Major.⁴⁶

Doolittle's wartime exploits read like a movie script. On 19 April 1942 then Lt. Col. Doolittle flew the first of sixteen B-25 bombers off the pitching deck of the carrier Hornet on a morale building mission to bomb Tokyo. For his part in the "Doolittle Raid" Jimmy was promoted to Brig. Gen., skipping the rank of full colonel. He was also awarded the congressional Medal of Honor by President Roosevelt for his part in the raid.⁴⁷ Doolittle was then sent to Gen. Eisenhower in England to organize and command the Twelfth Air Force. Eisenhower initially did not want Doolittle for the position but accepted him on the strong recommendation of Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold.⁴⁸ The future supreme allied commander's opinion changed as Doolittle proved himself equal to the test of combat command. In November 1942 Ike wrote:

⁴⁴O'Neil, Barnstormers & Speed Kings, pp. 157, 161.

⁴⁵Tillman, "Jimmy Doolittle: The First 80 Years," pp. 299, 301.

⁴⁶Glines, Doolittle, pp. 123-24.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 143, 147.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 150.

Doolittle is a curious mixture: he has certain strong points and fine qualities and I am going to considerable trouble to handle him in such a way as to help him eliminate his faults, in the belief that he will develop into a really brilliant air force commander.⁴⁹

In September 1943 he told Doolittle that, "in my opinion you have shown, during the past year, the greatest degree of improvement of any of the senior United States officers serving in my command."⁵⁰ By March of 1944 he was so impressed that he recommended Doolittle for promotion to the grade of lieutenant general noting that,

Doolittle's command is very large including about 19,000 officers, 133,000 enlisted men and 2,500 combat planes. He is an inspirational leader and in the last two years has progressed markedly in absorbing the duties and discharging the responsibilities of high command.⁵¹

Doolittle's reputation as "the most celebrated Air Force general"⁵² of the war added luster to his already well established reputation and made his selection as the head of Patterson's postwar board a logical if not self evident choice.

Doolittle's style of leadership particularly suited him to head the proposed board. The individualism of the fighter pilots who were responsible in combat only for themselves and perhaps a wingman and the tight cohesion of bomber crews made

⁴⁹Eisenhower to George C. Marshall, 30 November 1942, Eisenhower Papers, Vol. II, p. 780.

⁵⁰Eisenhower to James H. Doolittle, 1 September 1943, Eisenhower Papers, Vol. II, p. 1379.

⁵¹Eisenhower to George C. Marshall, 9 March 1944, Eisenhower Papers, Vol. III, p. 1764. For a summary of Doolittle's career and promotions see National Cyclopedia of American Biography (New York: James T. White & Co., 1946), G, pp. 69-70.

⁵²O'Neil, Barnstormers & Speed Kings, p. 171.

the officer-enlisted dividing line less distinct in the Air Force. The situation in the ground combat arms was quite different since, unlike the Air Force, the vast majority of the people who actually fought were enlisted men. One newspaper commented that General Doolittle's appointment to the board "brings to its deliberations a liberal background insofar as the air force attitude towards questions of discipline and officer-enlisted relationships is concerned."⁵³ Another noted that the members of Doolittle's Eighth Air Force had the reputation of enjoying liberties and privileges which made them the envy of GIs throughout the Army.⁵⁴ The same article concluded with a comment on Doolittle's leadership philosophy.

So there is undeniably a liberal at the head of this investigating group, an officer who doesn't believe in keeping his men bound up in the strait jackets of regulations.⁵⁵

Another newspaper account picked out the key points that must have figured prominently in Patterson's decision to select Doolittle, pointing out that as a temporary lieutenant general he was the highest ranking non-regular officer. It went on to add that Doolittle's follow-me leadership style, exemplified by flying the lead aircraft on the Tokyo Raid, made it tough to sneer at him as a "brass Hat."⁵⁶ When Doolittle decided to resign from the . . .

⁵³Kansas City Star, 20 March 1946, reprinted in G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "D", p. 142.

⁵⁴Springfield Union, 20 March 1946, reprinted in Ibid., p. 141.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1946, reprinted in Ibid., p. 160.

active force on 9 January 1946 and return to his job with Shell, he fulfilled the requirement that no member of the board be on active duty.⁵⁷ Since the purpose of the board was to contain the rising tide of criticism perhaps the most valid measure of Patterson's decision to appoint Doolittle is how the press reacted to it.

Without exception the major wire services and newspaper chains of the country supported Patterson's choice. Bill Henry in his Los Angeles Times column summed up the general reaction of the media. "It is pretty generally agreed that the Army couldn't have found anybody better than Doolittle to lead the investigation."⁵⁸ Another paper noted that the "move to place General Doolittle at the head of this committee is one to be commended."⁵⁹ If Patterson is to be judged based on the reaction to his choice then he did very well indeed. As the Washington Post succinctly put it "Secretary Patterson could not have chosen better."⁶⁰

While Doolittle was unquestionably the star attraction, the second general officer that Patterson selected to serve on the board was also well qualified. Troy H. Middleton had enlisted in the regular army on 3 March 1910.⁶¹ When World War II

⁵⁷National Cyclopedia of American Biography, G, 1943-46, p. 70.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹New Haven Register, 20 March 1946, reprinted in G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "D," p. 139.

⁶⁰Washington Post, 20 March 1946, reprinted in Ibid., p. 138.

⁶¹Doolittle Report, p. 22.

started he was called out of retirement to take command of the 45th Division.⁶² One historian has described him as "calm, almost implacable, painstaking, dependable."⁶³ Perhaps these attributes explain why he won his third star and, despite his age and problems with arthritis, why he was hand picked by Eisenhower to command the VIII Corps in the invasion of Europe.⁶⁴ Again the press pointed out in editorials some of Middleton's attributes that Patterson must have considered when he selected him to serve. The Kansas City Star noted 'hat in addition to his distinguished career as a ground force leader he was not a West Point graduate--a definite asset on this board since the Academy was considered the home of the caste system. The article continued by observing that Middleton's position as comptroller of Louisiana State University, since his retirement, had given him an excellent opportunity to gain insight into veterans thinking on the subject of officer-enlisted relations.⁶⁵ Another paper ran a column that suggested different reasons for Patterson's decision to appoint Middleton. The headline of the editorial by Don Robinson read, 'If Middleton's In There The Board's On the Level.'⁶⁶

⁶²William H. Mauldin, The Brass Ring (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1971), p. 123.

⁶³Charles B. MacDonald, The Mighty Endeavor: American Armed Forces In the European Theater In World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 294.

⁶⁴Ibid.; for Eisenhower's explanation as to why he chose Middleton for corps command see, New York Times, 19 February 1959, p. 14.

⁶⁵Kansas City Star, 20 March 1946, reprinted in G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "D," p. 142.

⁶⁶Army Times, 6 April 1946, p. 5.

The author had been the editor of the 45th Division News which was widely regarded as the best Division newspaper of the war.⁶⁷ Robinson explained how Middleton had many times saved both the 45th Division News and its soon-to-be-famous cartoonist Bill Mauldin from the wrath of "those upper-class generals" who did not appreciate the humor of Willie & Joe nor the scathing criticism of the editorial section.⁶⁸ By appointing Middleton, Patterson got a professional soldier who had risen from the ranks and one who was sympathetic to the soldier press.

As the writer of the "soundest" article on officer-enlisted relations that the Secretary of War had seen, Robert Neville was a natural choice for the board. Before the war Neville had worked as a reporter on the New York Herald Tribune and as foreign-news editor of Time. After Pearl Harbor he was drafted as a private, sent overseas as a staff sergeant working on the service magazine Yank, and was later commissioned a first lieutenant and made editor of the Mediterranean Theater version of Stars and Stripes. He served in that capacity for three years while advancing from Algiers to Rome. He was partly responsible for drafting Mauldin from the 45th Division News and giving him prominence on the staff of the best Army Daily newspaper of the war.⁶⁹ He was a lieutenant colonel by the time he left the Stars and Stripes in December of 1945 to return to his career as

⁶⁷Mauldin, The Brass Ring, p. 202.

⁶⁸Army Times, 6 April 1946, p. 5.

⁶⁹Neville, "What's Wrong With Our Army," pp. 104-05.

a civilian writer.⁷⁰

Patterson's decision to appoint Neville was a very astute move and probably helped to establish the board's respectability in the eyes of many of Neville's fellow journalists. The Secretary knew from the Life article that Nevill was opposed to making radical changes in the system. Neville attacked abuse of privilege by poor leaders not the concept of special privileges itself.⁷¹ Neville and his paper also had a reputation for uncensored criticism of both the brass and stupid regulations that served only to harass the troops.⁷² One editorial discussing the board members also pointed out that Neville's position as the editor of a theater wide newspaper allowed him to see thousands of letters from GIs in every type of unit.⁷³

Adna H. Underhill was the other mid-level officer appointed to the board and the only member who was not a widely known public figure. Underhill had served as a platoon sergeant before graduating from Officer Candidate School and was eventually promoted to the rank of captain in an airborne unit. He received the Purple Heart for a wound, and won a Silver Star while leading his company at Anzio.⁷⁴ While he represented no special interest group, he had come up through the ranks, had a distinguished

⁷⁰New York Times, 6 December 1945, p. 17.

⁷¹Neville, "What's Wrong With Our Army," p. 108.

⁷²Ibid., p. 111.

⁷³Kansas City Star, 20 March 1946, reprinted in G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "D", p. 142.

⁷⁴Doolittle Report, p. 23.

service record, and was representative of the company grade officer who was closest to the enlisted men in day to day activities. Perhaps an obscure officer was chosen for this position to dramatize the more famous enlisted representatives on the board.

Jake W. Lindsey achieved national recognition in May of 1945 when he became the one-hundredth infantryman to win the Congressional Medal of Honor. Lindsey, a former technical sergeant, received the award for his actions on 16 November 1944 while serving as a platoon leader near Hamich Germany. He was cited for extraordinary heroism in repulsing a German counter-attack during which he continued to fight the enemy though painfully wounded. He was forced to resort to his bayonet after his ammunition ran out. Lindsey personally killed twenty of the enemy, wounded an unknown number and captured three. In the process he knocked out two machine guns and captured two others.⁷⁵ Lindsey was flown back from Czechoslovakia to receive his medal from President Truman before a joint session of Congress on 21 May 1945.⁷⁶ Once again Secretary Patterson had chosen an individual hard to criticize. Lindsey was already a symbol of the fighting soldier. The whole purpose of his elaborate award ceremony was to honor all American war heroes by this representative act.⁷⁷ Even without this extra touch, the mere fact of having

⁷⁵Ibid.; New York Times, 4 May 1945, p. 8.

⁷⁶New York Times, 21 May 1945, p. 12; Ibid., 22 May 1945, p. 18.

⁷⁷Ibid., 4 May 1945, p. 18; Ibid., 22 May 1945, p. 1; Ibid., 22 May 1945, p. 18.

won the Medal of Honor would have qualified Lindsey to serve on the board, with it he became a symbol of all American fighting men and moved beyond the reach of critics.

The final appointee was Meryll M. Frost. Frost had been a sergeant with the 451st Bomb Group at Bari Italy when he almost died from injuries suffered in an aircraft fire. He spent eighteen months recuperating at Valley Forge General Hospital and then resumed his studies at Dartmouth College. In the fall of 1945 Frost was named captain of the Dartmouth football team and won the Philadelphia sportswriters award as the most courageous athlete of the year 1945.⁷⁸ Frost was just as much a symbol of enlisted men as Lindsey. First, his scars showed the obvious price he had paid during the war and represented the thousands of wounded veterans.⁷⁹ And second, his notoriety as the captain of an Ivy League Football Team was perhaps intended to serve as a reminder that enlisted men were gentlemen too.⁸⁰ In any event, a wounded veteran turned courageous athlete is almost as impervious to criticism as a Medal of Honor winner.

⁷⁸Doolittle Report, p. 23; Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1946, reprinted in G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "D", p. 160.

⁷⁹Men with visibly disfiguring wounds were apparently an asset on boards. On the Dodge commission of 1893-99 two members had limbs amputated while another had been wounded four times. Zais, Phd., p. 171.

⁸⁰Some of the witnesses who later testified before the board resented the terms "officers and men." The phrase "officer and a gentleman" was used in official publications--most notably in the Articles of War. The terms seemed to imply that "men" were not gentlemen. See New York Times, 27 June 1946, sec. IV, p. 20.

Once the carefully selected members had accepted the Secretary's invitation to participate, the official announcement on 18 March⁸¹ of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships came just in time to make the headlines with an embarrassing incident at the Army War College. The headline for 23 March 1946 on the front page of the weekly service newspaper Army Times shouted "Sock Grab Points Need For Doolittle Board."⁸² The Column went on to explain the connection:

The nation's two foremost 'Gripes of the Year'--the Army caste system and the nylon shortage--were joined in common cause here Washington D.C. this week when the 'officers only' Quartermaster Sales Store at the Army War College placed 25,000 pairs of surplus nylons on sale.

. . . the restricted nylon sale evoked a new storm of caste accusations.⁸³

Despite this inauspicious beginning, the press soon connected other events with the board that may or may not have been intended but had a more favorable result.

Three days after the announcement of the Doolittle Board, the War Department published a press release declaring that by July 1948 officers and enlisted men would wear the same uniform.⁸⁴ One eager reporter described the press release and noted that the War Department had made no mention of the rising chorus

⁸¹New York Times, 19 March 1946, p. 7.

⁸²Army Times, 23 March 1946, pp. 1, 6.

⁸³Ibid.; see also Time 47 (1 April 1946): 25.

⁸⁴War Department Press Release, 21 March 1946, "Military Personnel to have Same Uniform." This press release was reprinted as part of Brig. Gen. W. E. Bergin's testimony before the board, G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "A", Tab X.

of criticism of the caste system nor of the Doolittle Board when it announced the change. Despite this lack of evidence he concluded, "No one can doubt, however, that the order is the first step in the program the commission is to develop."⁸⁵ Whether it was planned or merely coincidental the announcement of the investigation followed immediately by the enactment of changes had a positive public relations effect.

Perhaps it was inevitable that some of the media coverage of the board would see through Patterson's careful preparations and come closer to the real reasons behind the study than the writers could have realized. One column titled "Army Tosses a Bone: Caste System Probe Just a Political Scp to Regain GI Affection, Writer Decides." This article, which appeared in the Washington Post, cynically claimed that "It doesn't take clairvoyance to spot the gimmick in this little lulu." The writer warned that unless the "investigation" turned out differently than most things of this sort, "there will be a lot of hollering, some white-wash, a couple of small scandals, and then peace, while the old regime takes hold again and the old system continues to flourish."⁸⁶ Another article in The New Republic reported that,

Cynical GIs express suspicions that the whole thing may be merely a publicity stunt to 'sugar-coat' the recruiting program, with the 'big brass' quietly pigeonholing the

⁸⁵Norfolk Virginia Pilot, 23 March 1946, reprinted in G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "D", p. 180.

⁸⁶Washington Post, 20 March 1946, reprinted in Ibid., p. 135.

recommendations later on.⁸⁷

Fortunately for Patterson these articles, which so closely discerned his real purpose for appointing the board, formed only a small part of the generally positive media coverage.

Criticism that was directed at the board members did not focus on Patterson's choices but rather on interest groups that were not represented. Most of the early criticism of the board complained that there were only two ex-enlisted men on the board and of those that were, none were below the rank of sergeant. Some viewed this as being unfair since approximately one-third of the Army were in the rank of corporal or below.⁸⁸ Others argued that an enlisted man from the service forces should have been included since many of the most severe criticisms originated in the rear areas.⁸⁹ Negro organizations criticized the constituency of the board for not including a black member.⁹⁰ The only complaint raised about the board members as a group was concern that their experience was limited geographically. This in-house critic pointed out that four of the members had served primarily in the Mediterranean Theater and while General Doolittle had

⁸⁷"Army Caste System," The New Republic 114 (8 April 1946): 461.

⁸⁸Army Times, 30 March 1946, p. 15; Record of Press Conference, 27 March 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V; "First Agenda Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships," 23 March 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab I; Oregonian (Portland, Ore.), 20 March 1946, reprinted in G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "D", p. 179.

⁸⁹Kansas City Star, 20 March 1946, reprinted in *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁹⁰Bender, "Daily Diary," 9 April 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab F; letter from Eisenhower to White, 4 April 1946, Eisenhower Papers, Vol. 7, pp. 985-86.

served for short periods in the Pacific in 1942 and 1945, most of his experience had been in Europe. The writer was worried that one notorious rear area commander in Italy, Maj. Gen. Arthur Wilson, who had received a great deal of publicity in Neville's Stars and Stripes, might unduly influence the findings of the committee. His last paragraph points out the importance of appointing a widely representative panel in order to gain public credibility.

If the Army hopes to really get some value out of this Board, and not use it essentially as a sop to appease congressional and public opinion (which may be the purpose for all I know), I believe a bit of broadening of the membership would serve a very useful purpose.⁹¹

Despite the almost inevitable criticism of frustrated interest groups, the press reaction to the members as a whole was overwhelmingly positive. The Washington Post stated that,

The diversity of viewpoint and experience among the men named to the board by the Secretary affords full assurance that the inquiry will be thoroughly fair and searching and that the criticism leveled at Army traditions will be faithfully explored.⁹²

After claiming that general opinion considered the caste system investigation to be "the hottest thing in years" the Los Angeles Times reported people generally agreed that,

. . . the personnel of the committee to conduct the investigation is excellent. It would be hard to find a better

⁹¹Memorandum for General Lincoln, 21 March 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab I, the writer incorrectly states that Middleton served only in the MTO. His greatest accomplishment was commanding VIII Corps during the Battle of the Bulge. I could not identify the writer as the memo was only initialed R. J. W. and carried no office symbol. From the context he apparently worked in either the BPR or I & E division.

⁹²Washington Post, 20 March 1946, reprinted in G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "D", p. 138.

group of men of various ranks, from various parts of the country, of different temperments, and less subject to criticism themselves.⁹³

Other papers heralded the board as being well equipped to review what many considered the main problem that inhibited volunteers from joining the Army. Several stated essentially that "From Doolittle on down to a buck sergeant the personnel of the committee is representative of our civilian Army."⁹⁴

Between the announcement of the Board on 18 March and the first session on 27 March, several seemingly insignificant decisions were made by the Secretary and the chairman that enhanced the respectability of the board. When Major Bender sought to clarify the Secretary of War's relationship to the operation of the board he was informed that Patterson intended to give the board complete freedom of action and complete independence in methods of procedures relative to hearings, reports, etc.⁹⁵ This was obviously a wise decision since excessive interference from the Secretary would be seen by the press as an attempt to control the findings of the board. It is more likely that Patterson made his intentions clear to Doolittle during their meeting on 12 March in a mission type order that left the details up to the chairman.

Other decisions made by Doolittle showed that he had not lost his flair for public relations. The same day the board was

⁹³Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1946, reprinted in *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁹⁴Journal Gazette (Ft. Wayne, Ind.), 26 March 1946, reprinted in *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁹⁵Bender, "Daily Diary," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, 22 March 1946.

announced to the press Doolittle decided that for appearances sake, hearings should not be held in the Pentagon. He directed Bender to obtain space in some centrally located non-military building in the District.⁹⁶ After no little expenditure of effort a suitable site was found in the Association of Electrical Workers Building located at 1200 15th Street NW. Later at a press conference Doolittle made sure that the significance was not lost on the reporters when he explained,

The reason that place was selected away from the Pentagon Building, and away from the government is so there would be no feeling that this Board was in any way influenced by other than the result of the testimony from witnesses and our own sincere belief.⁹⁷

The board made other decisions to insure that they did not appear as War Department lackeys. During their first meeting they decided--no doubt at the suggestion of Doolittle--refer to all board members as "Mr." and to have name plates so prepared. They also agreed that no correspondence received by the board should be answered on War Department stationery.⁹⁸ Doolittle must have been gratified when a New York Times reporter, among others, picked up on these small points and used them to indicate the independent nature of the investigation.⁹⁹

Since the board could expect to have a difficult time in

⁹⁶Bender memorandum for W. S. Gaud, Special Asst. to S/W, 18 March 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V.

⁹⁷Record of Press Conference, 27 March 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, p. 2.

⁹⁸"Report of Meeting of Board Members Wednesday, 1030-1230, 27 March 1946," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab I.

⁹⁹New York Times, 5 April 1946, p. 17.

separating "grippers" from men with legitimate complaints the decision to hold closed session hearings was another wise choice. Because press coverage was important to the real mission of the board, Doolittle was quick to point out to reporters that while they could not sit in on the hearings they could talk to the witnesses outside of the official session as much as they wanted to.¹⁰⁰ This struck a reasonable balance between no coverage of the proceedings on the one hand and hopefully prevented the hearings from becoming useless gripe sessions on the other. As Middleton said "this was to be an investigation not a show."¹⁰¹

Major Bender still had several unanswered questions that would largely determine how long the "hearings will (or should) continue."¹⁰² If all who wanted to testify were not heard some good reasons were needed to explain why. On the other hand if the board decided to hear everyone the hearings could drag on for months and thus fail to accomplish Patterson's main purpose for appointing it in the first place. In addition to the Secretary's desire for cutting the hearings short, Doolittle had his own reasons for finishing quickly. He was scheduled to make a publicity tour of South America in April as part of his duties as vice president of the Shell Oil Company.¹⁰³ Because of this

¹⁰⁰Record of Press Conference, 27 March 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, p. 1.

¹⁰¹Army Times, 6 April 1946, p. 5.

¹⁰²"First Agenda Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships," 23 March 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab I.

¹⁰³Thomas and Jablonski, Doolittle, p. 317.

schedule he informed Bender by 30 March that he had decided the hearings "will be completed" by 3 April.¹⁰⁴ Clearly Doolittle could not tell the press that this very important study would be cut short so that he could sell Shell products in South America. This would have admitted to the public that the board was not planning to recommend any serious changes. Instead Doolittle slightly camouflaged his real purpose. At a press conference on 27 March he told reporters that he hoped to finish as quick as possible for two reasons: the work was important and its findings should be made available as quickly as possible; and the board members were all anxious to get back to their individual jobs.¹⁰⁵ The first reason given appears in some respects to be a non sequitur. If the work was so important one would assume that those assigned to study it would want to be very thorough and comprehensive in their approach. Doolittle reiterated the point when he later claimed that "speed is of greater importance than hearing everyone who wished to talk."¹⁰⁶ In the event, he announced on 4 April that the board felt all viewpoints had been expressed adequately and thus hearings would be suspended.¹⁰⁷ He also noted that a mass of written and printed material had been assembled and thus the conclusion of hearings would "provide

¹⁰⁴Bender memorandum for W. S. Gaud, Special Asst. to S/W, 30 March 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V.

¹⁰⁵Record of Press Conference, 27 March 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, p. 2.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁰⁷Record of Press Conference, 4 April 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V.

an interim for study and analysis."¹⁰⁸ Doolittle departed on his trip to South America on 7 April, right on schedule.¹⁰⁹

When the *Army Times* asked its readers to "Tell Doolittle About It!" over half of the letters solicited to make suggestions concerning the caste system denounced instead the Army's system of military justice.¹¹⁰ Secretary Patterson was certainly aware of the situation. On 20 February he had written to an ex-Army lawyer noting that the Senate Judiciary Committee had passed a resolution to investigate the Army and Navy court-martial systems. Nothing had been done yet, he indicated, but "It will undoubtedly come."¹¹¹

Perhaps with the idea in mind that he could parry the congressional investigation with a War Department study, Patterson appointed an advisory committee on military justice seven days after he announced the Doolittle board and two days before the caste board held its first meeting.¹¹² The committee was to study the administration of military justice and to recommend

¹⁰⁸Doolittle to Major Robert J. McDuff, 8 April 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab II, Envelope "A", this is an example of a form letter sent to thank witnesses for appearing before the board.

¹⁰⁹*New York Times*, 14 April 1946, p. 13.

¹¹⁰For the headline see *Army Times*, 6 April 1946, p. 1; concerning the statistics on letters referring to the court-martial system see *Army Times*, 20 April 1946, p. 2.

¹¹¹Patterson to Col. Edward S. Hemphill, 20 February 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI.

¹¹²In his book *America's Army in Crisis*, Col. William Hauser postulated that "Preliminary findings of the Doolittle board may have influenced the launching of the Vanderbilt Committee (p. 54). The military justice study could not have been influenced by the "preliminary" findings because the board did not meet until 27 March--two days after the Vanderbilt committee was announced.

changes in existing practices considered necessary to improve the administration of justice in the Army.¹¹³ If Patterson hoped that Congress would quietly drop its proposal to investigate the court-martial system he was soon disappointed. Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon declared that a self-investigation by the services was not enough. He went on to urge the Senate to act without delay to investigate military justice for itself. He did not want the services to "substitute an investigation of their own" for what he claimed was the "clear obligation" of the Senate.¹¹⁴

Based on the types of investigatorial panels he appointed, Judge Patterson apparently viewed the officer-enlisted problem in an entirely different light from the question of military justice. Instead of handpicking for himself the members of the board to consider army justice, he invited Willis Smith, the president of the American Bar Association, to make the nominations. Smith chose Dean Arthur T. Vanderbilt of the New York University Law School as chairman. The nine man panel eventually selected included five former presidents of the American Bar Association.¹¹⁵ By removing himself completely from the process Secretary Patterson gained a great deal of respectability for the panel but paid for this with his lack of any influence over the operations or findings of the group.

¹¹³War Department Memorandum No. 25-46, "War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice," 25 March 1946, G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "E".

¹¹⁴Army Times, 30 March 1946, pp. 1, 16.

¹¹⁵New York Times, 26 March 1946, p. 31.

In addition to his apparent purpose of undercutting outside investigation of Army Justice, Patterson expected the Vanderbilt committee to do a thorough study and make sound recommendations which he could then consider for implementation. While the board included well qualified experts in the field of law, only one or two could claim to be nationally known figures. Rather than rush the job in order to show quick results in order to placate public opinion, Secretary Patterson assigned no suspense date for the committee to submit its findings and in fact he did not receive the actual report until 20 December 1946.¹¹⁶

A comparison of the differences between the Doolittle and Vanderbilt studies highlights Patterson's purpose for appointing them. Members of the Doolittle board were chosen for their symbolic value, their service records and for their recognizable names. The Vanderbilt committee contained men who were well known and respected within their fields but little known outside it. The caste board was to make recommendations that were easy to implement and did not fundamentally change the basic military structure. The justice committee was given no such instructions since they were neither selected nor controlled by the Secretary. Finally the Doolittle study would be most effective if completed quickly while with the Vanderbilt group, thoroughness and accuracy were more important than speed since their recommendations could have untold effects on Army discipline if their proposed reforms went too far.

¹¹⁶Patterson to Honorable Raymond S. Wilkins, 21 December 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI.

Despite the obvious overlap in the two topics, Secretary Patterson was careful to keep the problems separate. Many of the witnesses who testified before the Doolittle board came prepared to discuss the court-martial system but were told "There is a separate board handling" that problem or that the caste board would only take a "casual glance" at that aspect.¹¹⁷ When the Doolittle board submitted its findings to Patterson and included a reference to the court-martial problem, Bender reported the Secretary's reaction: "The Judge was surprised and perturbed that the Board had made recommendations on military justice."¹¹⁸ Patterson's sharp separation of a closely related problem seems to support the assertion that one board was appointed to make peripheral recommendations designed to placate public opinion, while the other was to study the problem with great care and present substantive suggestions. The Vanderbilt committee can be considered part of a public relations ploy only because the War Department could use its existence to claim that a study was underway and thus could both delay making changes until the pressure eased and forestall outside investigation of the problem.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "A", for quotes see the testimony of Hardy and Neeson Tab XI, and Mauldin Tab II, for other witnesses who brought up the court-martial question see Tabs, I, IV and XXV.

¹¹⁸"Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Doolittle and Major Bender, 0900, 22 May," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V.

¹¹⁹Underscretary of War Kenneth Royall used the ongoing Vanderbilt committee as evidence that the War Department was concerned with the problem of military justice. His statement was prompted by the report of a congressional subcommittee. Army Times (27 April 1946), p. 18.

Before the Doolittle board could commence its official hearings on 28 March, the problem of determining who should be allowed to testify had to be resolved. As early as 13 March Bender began to wrestle with this question. His first solution was to ask the members of the board to recommend names of possible witnesses. He suggested the following order: enlisted men, company officers, field officers, general officers and finally correspondents.¹²⁰ This plan did not produce the requisite number and on 19 March Bender wrote in his diary, "Difficulties being encountered: Limited time in which to schedule witnesses and necessity of being arbitrary in determining who should appear."¹²¹ Bender then contacted several officers in the Army Staff personnel section for advice. One general, concerned with getting a random sample, suggested that the board draw by lot from the rosters of the three major forces. When Bender pointed out to another general the short time left before the hearings were to start they agreed that only witnesses from the local area should be contacted.¹²² As more and more people began calling the Secretary of War asking to appear before the board, the problem became serious enough to have an adverse public relations effect. As Bender put it, "The question arises as to whether or not each should be accepted as a witness, and if not, what type of reply would eliminate any unfavorable newspaper comment."¹²³

¹²⁰Bender, "Daily Dairy," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, 13 March 1946.

¹²¹Ibid., 19 March.

¹²²Ibid. The three major Army forces were ground, air and service.

¹²³Ibid., 20 March.

At this point the recorder decided to prepare interim replies and leave the final statement to the chairman when he arrived on 27 March. Doolittle approved the scheduling of the initial witnesses by phone on 22 March and agreed to the other actions Bender had taken.

The witness question was resolved at the first board meeting on 27 March. Since Doolittle's South American plans imposed a definite completion date on the hearings, Bender computed the number of witnesses needed allowing approximately forty-five minutes for each. The limited number of time slots available probably caused the board to shift the focus from hearing only military personnel, as the proposal for a random sample suggested, and instead decided to select a "representative sampling of all agencies." The problem concerning how to turn volunteers away without causing bad press was neatly resolved by simply requesting them to submit a prepared statement.¹²⁴ This compromise allowed the board to turn away people while letting them feel that they had contributed something. One detects Doolittle's expert public relations touch in such a satisfactory arrangement.

Once the board had established its overall objectives, many of the same criteria were used to select witnesses as had been considered by Patterson when he chose the members. The board wanted the relatively small number of witnesses to represent as many interest groups and factions as possible. Ideally the board should have heard from all levels of the military rank structure

¹²⁴"Report of Meeting of Board Members Wednesday, 1030-1230, 27 March 1946," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab I.

with emphasis on the enlisted men since the main purpose of the procedure was to allow them to air their gripes. The primary guiding principle behind the choices was to select the widest possible cross section in order to claim that their findings, which had largely been predetermined, reflected the thinking of the vast majority of all concerned groups. If well known public figures fulfilling these criteria could be found so much the better since their credibility with the public would already have been established.

By 30 March the list of witnesses was essentially complete¹²⁵ and those selected largely achieved the ideal characteristics outlined above. The board held thirty-eight hearings between 28 March and 4 April and one on 15 May 1946. In all, forty-two witnesses were heard. Of the forty-two, thirty-eight were either present or former military men of whom seventeen had served as officers and twenty-one as enlisted men. Three of the officers had at one time been enlisted and one man had served as an officer in World War I and an enlisted man in World War II. Of the four non-veterans two were correspondents, one a representative of the Red Cross and one Congresswoman.¹²⁶

The group as a whole represented a wide range of interest groups. Spokesmen appeared for the Socialist Party, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Veterans of World War II and the

¹²⁵Major General Butler B. Miltonberger, Chief, National Guard Bureau, was later added to the list. "List of Witnesses," G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "A"; Bender to Ted Cronynn, 30 March, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab II.

¹²⁶"List of Witnesses," G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "A".

Veterans League of America. Representatives were specifically requested from the Red Cross and from the FBI because they were neither enlisted nor commissioned and saw a great deal of both sides of military life.¹²⁷ Five women appeared including two WACs and a nurse in addition to the Congresswoman and the Red Cross worker. One black was invited to testify. The military rank structure was represented from private all way up to General of the Army Eisenhower. Twenty-two of those who testified were invited to appear while the other twenty volunteered. This was an important consideration since as Eisenhower pointed out, the grippers were more likely to volunteer.¹²⁸

The only aspect of the witnesses as a group that was not widely representative was their geographical distribution. Thirty-two of the forty-two were from Washington or the immediate area. Of the other ten none came from further west than Kentucky. This is further evidence to indicate the rushed nature of the board.¹²⁹

One other aspect of the group chosen to testify deserves to be mentioned. A few weeks before the board was appointed, when a theater commander attempted to censor the Stars and Stripes, there was a great deal of outrage in the media, for a short time making the issue of censorship even more important than

¹²⁷Record of Press Conference, 4 April 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, p. 5.

¹²⁸For Eisenhower's comment see his testimony before the board, G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "A", Tab XIV, p. 7; for information on other witnesses see "List of Witnesses," G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "A."

¹²⁹Ibid.

officer-enlisted relations.¹³⁰ The problem was quickly resolved¹³¹ but the image of embattled editors standing up to the brass was still fresh in the public eye. The board capitalized on this high visibility not only by having Neville as a member but by hearing Bill Mauldin, Marion Hargrove of "See Here Private Hargrove" fame, and Joe McCarthy former editor of Yank magazine as witnesses. In addition to these representatives of the soldier press: the board heard Hanson Baldwin, military correspondent of the New York Times, Frank Waldrop, A Washington newspaperman and Bernie Lay a Washington writer from the civilian media.¹³² Given the limited amount of time for hearings the board could hardly have chosen a more credible, more widely representative group to testify.

Besides testimony given at the hearings, the other major source of information was the daily flow of letters to the board. Between 22 March and 30 April, 1080 letters were received including 326 forwarded from the Army Times. While most letters were sent to Doolittle as chairman of the board others were addressed to the "Army Gripe Board," the "Army 'Caste System' Beef Board" and even to the "Investigating Committee on Army Brass Hatism." Of the 754 letters sent to the board (not counting those received by Army Times) 450 could be identified as

¹³⁰"Current Army Public Relations Problems," 27 March 1946, NA, SPMS 330.11; New York Times, 18 March 1946, p. 4.

¹³¹New York Times, 20 March 1946, p. 12.

¹³²"List of Witnesses," G-1 file. Box 521, Exhibit "A"; Army Times, 6 April 1946, pp. 1, 6.

coming from present or former military personnel. Of these 336 were from enlisted men and 124 from officers. Forty-seven of the 460 had served in World War I. Of the remaining 413, about 158 had served overseas during the war. The actual number in combat could not be determined but since only about forty percent had served abroad it appears that combat troops were under-represented.¹³³

The letters contained many more abusive comments than were obtained from witnesses who appeared in person. By far the largest number of complaints were directed at social discrimination by officers. The next most discussed topic involved inequities arising from such perquisites as special officers rations, quarters, recreation facilities, uniforms, etc. Based on frequency the next most discussed subject was the inequitable administration of military justice.¹³⁴

At a press conference on 4 April Doolittle announced that the first phase of the work was completed; the board felt it had heard an adequate cross section of those who wanted to testify. He said that the board's next job was to study the testimony, letters and literature on the subject. Doolittle announced that the board would recess for about three weeks to allow the recorder time to prepare an initial report. He claimed that the three week period was "an arbitrary time" and that "in the

¹³³"Letters To Board," G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "B"; Doolittle Report, pp. 13-15.

¹³⁴"Letters To Board," G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "B".

meantime we will continue our studies."¹³⁵ When the board next met in mid-May their main purpose was to complete the report for the Secretary of War. Meanwhile, Jimmy Doolittle had a plane to catch.

¹³⁵Record of Press Conference, 4 April 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTATION: PERCEIVED AND REAL

Doolittle returned from his South American tour and stopped over in Washington on 10 May 1946 to pick up a draft copy of the report. Major Bender had spent the interim analyzing the correspondence, writing the report and arranging for the next meeting of the board.¹ Bender, now the resident expert on officer-enlisted relations, also took time out to fly to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill to answer questions concerning the problem after a presentation by Undersecretary of War Kenneth Royall.² Doolittle went on to his Shell office in New York and by 13 May had prepared a list of changes for the board to consider at the next meeting.³ One last crisis arose before the members reassembled. Lindsey apparently felt that he had not been adequately compensated for his earlier trip. Faced with the potentially disastrous public relations consequences of having

¹Bender, "Daily Diary," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, 11, 12 April 1946.

²Ibid., 15 April 1946.

³Doolittle memorandum for Members of the Board, 13 May 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V (included in envelope with Bender's "Daily Diary").

one of the enlisted members default, the ever capable Bender promised to insure that his claims were paid and to arrange for a cheaper hotel for him on the forthcoming trip.⁴ Because of previous commitments Doolittle was unable to return until the afternoon of 15 May. Another board member, Robert Neville, decided to catch a ride with him so neither were present for the final hearings on that day.

Major General Butler B. Miltonberger testified before four of the board members on 15 May 1946. Middleton, Underhill, Frost and Lindsey heard the Chief of the National Guard Bureau speak as the representative of that politically powerful organization.⁵ Doolittle and Neville arrived from New York in time for the first full board meeting held 1525-1645 that same afternoon.⁶ The second and final meeting of the group took place the following day. The board shifted its meeting place from downtown Washington to the Pentagon and deliberated until 2030 on the 16th.⁷ One of the main concerns at these meetings was the problem of how the findings could best be presented to the press.

Doolittle had since the end of the first week of hearings been concerned with how to best present the board's report. At the press conference on 4 April when asked how long the report

⁴Bender, "Daily Diary," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, 13 May 1946.

⁵Ibid., 15 May 1946; "List of Witnesses," G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "A."

⁶Bender, "Daily Diary," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, 15 May 1946.

⁷Ibid., 16 May 1946.

might be, he answered:

. . . short enough to be printed in toto . . . not over 5,000 words perhaps on the order of 3,000 words . . .
I feel that the value of this report, in addition to the speed with which it is made available, will be enhanced⁸ by its brevity, provided all important phases are covered.

This statement came about as close as it could to admitting Patterson's real purpose for convening the board. The chairman reinforced this concern in his memorandum to the board members. Doolittle wrote,

We have to be extremely careful that the report is so written that disjointed bits and pieces can not be taken out by the press who will seek the sensational and thus give the wrong impression of our findings.⁹

To avoid this he suggested that they put the conclusions after the statement of the problem and plan of investigation to insure that,

. . . there will not be the tendency to have the main thing lost in the body of the report, then when the press gets this, they will take a quick look and have a tendency to skip the more dangerous controversial testimony.¹⁰

And again later in his list of suggested changes: ". . . I am afraid that the press will take hunks out."¹¹ The other members apparently were satisfied by the evening of the 16th of May and all except Doolittle left town the next day.¹²

⁸Record of Press Conference, 4 April 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V.

⁹Doolittle memorandum for Members of the Board, 13 May 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, p. 1.

¹⁰Ibid., Conclusions and Recommendations were actually listed in the Senate document version of the report.

¹¹Ibid., p. 3.

¹²Bender, "Daily Diary," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, 17 May 1946.

The chairman and the recorder completed the corrections to the report and submitted copies to the Secretary of War on 20 May.¹³ Two days later, Patterson's special assistant contacted Bender to convey the Secretary's opinion and recommended changes. These included several typographical errors and one change of wording which required a new page to be inserted into the mimeographed copies that Bender had distributed. The change concerned a rather direct accusation of West Point as the main source of the "attitude of class superiority among . . . officers" Bender rewrote the paragraph in the passive voice and in that form it was apparently acceptable to the Secretary since it appeared in the final version.¹⁴ In the 4 April press conference Doolittle had stated that the board had not submitted an interim report to the Secretary ". . . and do not intend to until we present our final report."¹⁵ Despite this public show of independence a new page twenty-eight was printed and inserted into the existing copies before Patterson released the report to

¹³Ibid., 20 May 1946.

¹⁴"Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Doolittle and Major Bender, 0900, 22 May," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V; The first version in part read, "The peace-time system of officer training, especially at West Point, developed . . . a feeling that they were of a class superior to the enlisted personnel" This is contained in Board Report, A. Preparation at various stages, 23 May 1946, Box 522, Tab IV; The updated version changed this to, "It was claimed that the peace-time system for training officers developed an attitude of class superiority . . . that they were better than the enlisted personnel whom they commanded. It was stated . . . that this attitude was especially true of the graduates of West Point" Doolittle Report, p. 12 (p. 28 in mimeographed version).

¹⁵Record of Press Conference, 4 April 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, p. 4.

the press. Doolittle insisted that a new page be inserted rather than have an errata sheet put out that would let everyone know that the Secretary had made a change. As Doolittle told Bender during their phone conversation, "I'm afraid it might look as though we have been dominated, which we have."¹⁶

Patterson released the report to the press on 27 May, and it was generally well received. On 31 May Bender reported to Doolittle's secretary that he had, ". . . talked to several officers in Bureau of Public Relations and the topic discussed was the very favorable editorial comment concerning the Board Report in nearly all of the large newspapers over the country."¹⁷ The pro-enlisted Army Times claimed that if the recommendations were carried into effect they would cause "the most drastic and far-reaching" changes since the Russian Revolution.¹⁸ The New York Times and Time magazines were generally positive but withheld any real comment until they saw what the War Department would actually do with the recommendations.¹⁹

Patterson studied the report and circulated copies to the War Department General Staff for comments. Finally on 25 June he issued a press release that seems to have won over most of the

¹⁵"Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Mr. Doolittle and Major Bender, 0900, 22 May," G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V, p. 2.

¹⁷Bender to Miss Mary E. Gill, Secretary to General Doolittle, 31 May 1946, Doolittle Papers, Box 34.

¹⁸Army Times, 1 June 1946, p. 6.

¹⁹New York Times, 28 May 1946, p. 5; Time 47 (3 June 1946): 26.

remainder of the media. The Army Times exuberantly announced "Patterson Approves 12 of 14 Doolittle Board Suggestions."²⁰ The New York Times noted that the Secretary in his acceptance of the principle points "has taken what appeals [Sic] to us as a sensible view of the whole matter."²¹ While the press was being convinced, some military men, who knew how the board had gone about the study, privately expressed their reservations about placing much stock in the recommendations.

The man closest to the board was the first one to express doubts about its procedures. On 3 May Bender wrote to the assistant chief of staff for personnel that ". . . a study as involved as this should be done over a longer period of time."²² In his after action report he elaborated on the same theme:

In any plan for future boards, tackling a problem as extensive and far-reaching as this one . . . , there should be provided to board members ample time for more thorough acquaintance with all details and phases of whatever problem, prior to holding of hearings, and subsequent to hearings in order to permit more comprehensive review and analysis.²³

Even Eisenhower, who presumably knew what Patterson's intentions were with regard to the board, cautioned against implementing the recommendations from such a hasty study. Eisenhower noted that the comments of his staff, which were included in the supporting documents of the board, had been prepared under "great

²⁰Army Times, 29 June 1946, pp. 1, 20.

²¹New York Times, 27 June 1946, p. 20.

²²Bender memorandum for Maj. Gen. W. S. Paul, 3 May 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab V.

²³"Administrative Report of the Recorder of Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships," 31 May 1946, G-1 file, Box 522, Tab I, p. 5.

pressure as to time." He then concluded, "It is my opinion that this entire subject must be carefully and thoroughly considered. Since the report has been made public, immediate action on the entire report is not so urgent."²⁴ Contrast this with Patterson's belief that "It would be relatively easy to remedy most of these conditions."²⁵ Patterson's intent was to make only peripheral changes but the apparent misunderstanding by the uniformed military anticipated the general opinion in the military that developed after the board's recommendations were "implemented."

Before discussing the reactions, an understanding of the specific recommendations will be useful. The fourteen recommendations will only be listed here as they will be covered in detail later. The first proposal of the board was to improve leadership in the officer corps of the Army by: better selection; more adequate orientation and indoctrination; effective training; proper assignments; promotion on the basis of merit; careful screening and selecting out of undesirables; and a more effective internal policing system to prevent abuses of privileges.

The new board went on to recommend a whole series of specific actions including a requirement of one year of service in the enlisted ranks for officer candidates and the implementation of a merit system of promotion. The second recommendation

²⁴Eisenhower memorandum for the Secretary of War, 1 June 1946, Modern Military Division, War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Coordination and Records Section, Records Group 165, Box 309, C/S Decimial File 334 "D", National Archives Building, Washington D.C. (hereinafter referred to as C/S 334 "D").

²⁵Patterson memorandum for General Collins, 24 February 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 21, file "O" Miscellany.

basically required equal treatment for officers and enlisted-men under the law. Specific items included were equitable base pay and allowances for food, quarters, uniforms, and travel. The third point suggested that enlisted-men be allowed to accumulate leave time and be granted terminal leave pay on the same basis as officers. The fourth and eleventh recommendations were similar in nature and thus can be considered together. Both concerned discrimination against enlisted-men based on rank. One urged that enlisted-men be allowed to pursue normal social patterns when off duty; the other would abolish all institutional requirements forbidding association of soldiers based on rank. The fifth recommendation extended this same point over the families of enlisted-men. The sixth concerned equal treatment in the administration of military justice and made the specific recommendation that enlisted-men be allowed to sit on courts-martial. The seventh raised the question of abolishing the hand salute off-post and off-duty. Equality in the distribution of medals and awards was the topic of the eighth point while the ninth called for strengthening the Inspector General's section including the suggestion that the inspectors send reports to the War Department outside command channels. The tenth recommendation would require that all regulations be so written that they stipulate the "privileges" allowed to positions of responsibility and prohibit or minimize possible abuse of them. The twelfth recommendation sought to eliminate the terms "officer" and "enlisted-men" and would replace them with "members of the commissioned corps" and "members of the noncommissioned corps." The thirteenth proposed that close contact and association between

military men and civilians be encouraged. And finally, number fourteen suggested further study of the problem. These were the recommendations, some vague and sweeping in nature, some specific and insignificant, and some in between. In order to appreciate better the actual importance and extent of the implementation of each recommendation, it will be useful first to consider the perceived effects of these fourteen points from the summer of 1946 until the present.²⁶

The positive reaction from the War Department which accompanied the approval of most of the recommendations quickly soured. By the end of 1946 when Doolittle was scheduled to receive one of his many special awards, according to Doolittle's biographers Thomas and Jablonski, the Awards committee could not find an Air Force officer willing to present the certificate. Eventually Admiral Arleigh Burke did the honors, but the incident indicated the growing animosity of the Army towards the perceived effects of the board.²⁷ In early 1947 one infantry first sergeant wrote,

Thanks to some noisy and completely uninformed civilians we have about killed the caste system and in doing so we have all but killed an innocent bystander--the non-commissioned officer.²⁸

This complaint was heard more and more frequently after the poor Army performance during the early battles of the Korean War.

²⁶Doolittle Report. pp. 19-23.

²⁷Thomas and Jablonski, Doolittle, p. 318.

²⁸Wayne A. Jedro, "What's Happened to the Noncom?," Infantry Journal 60 (March 1947): 22.

The professional soldiers who led the understrength and half trained army in the first few battles of the Korean War realized that something was very wrong with the system and gradually began to agree on the source of their problems. For example, when Sergeant Lloyd W. Pate was released from a North Korean prison camp, there was no doubt in his mind what was wrong with the Army and what had caused it. The problem was a lack of discipline. The source of this problem, according to Pate, was "That Doolittle Board who wanted to make everything dandy for the poor damn private, that's what did it. And you can quote me on that."²⁹ Hanson Baldwin, who had testified before the board, sensed this grass-roots feeling and agreed with the sergeant in a New York Times column discussing the reasons for the low morale in the services, he wrote, "The post-war 'Doolittle Board,' . . . caused severe damage to service effectiveness by recommendations intended to 'democratize' the Army—a concept that is self-contradictory."³⁰ Baldwin repeated the claim that the noncommissioned officer had been stripped of most of his "dignity, prestige, and authority."³¹ He also noted that the services were becoming unattractive, a situation that could and did lead to problems in recruiting and retention of soldiers. As if to substantiate Baldwin's assertions, an article featuring two first

²⁹William A. Ulman, "The GI's Who Fell for the Reds," The Saturday Evening Post 226 (6 March 1954): 64.

³⁰New York Times, 3 September 1953, p. 10.

³¹Ibid.

sergeants who had decided to get out agreed with him as to the source of the problem and pointed out what gradually became the most significant perceived effect of the board. One of the sergeants, a veteran of the Philippines, expressed his obviously deeply held conviction:

After the war, they [civilians] all became experts on how the Army should run itself. They got together on the Doolittle Board and said the Army was undemocratic, that officers and men should wear the same uniforms, that enlisted men deserved more rank.³²

The first sergeant went on to discuss specific changes that "they" had implemented.

They junked the Articles of War and drew up a new Code of Military Justice, which took away the power of trial and punishment from the company commander.³³

The reporter noted that he heard these views, or variations of them, throughout the division in which he conducted his interviews. Baldwin later added this connection with military justice reform to his list of changes wrought by the board. In an article titled "Our Fighting Men Have Gone Soft?" he concluded:

The Doolittle-board 'reforms' after the war--which slackened discipline and led to a revision of the Code of Military Justice--were a concession to civilian pressures . . .³⁴

The tendency to assert a connection between the Doolittle Board and the changes in military justice seems to have been widespread by 1959 and when this article appeared.

³²Milton Lehman, "Why Are They Quitting?," The Saturday Evening Post 228 (30 July 1955): 72.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Hanson Baldwin, "Our Fighting Men Have Gone Soft?" The Saturday Evening Post 232 (8 August 1959): 84.

Just before the turn of the decade a book appeared which attempted to divine the reasons for the generally poor showing and epidemic breakdown of GIs under Communist brainwashing tactics. Journalist Eugene Kinkead interviewed an Army colonel who clearly presented the service point of view. The anonymous colonel believed that "the Army's lack of discipline stemmed mainly from the acceptance by the service of the recommendations of the Doolittle Board."³⁵ He accused the board of basing its recommendations on a very slender sampling and since the war had just been won, of thinking in terms of manning peacetime garrisons rather than of maintaining an effective fighting force.³⁶ The colonel claimed that the board had two bad effects on discipline. First it left the company grade officer feeling that he had been stripped of his punitive power, particularly his power of summary court-martial. And second since the officers felt that they lacked the power to back up the decisions of their noncommissioned subordinates they too shied away from responsibility. Finally he condemned the board for its recommendation to strengthen the Inspector General system. The colonel admitted that the junior officer "had not been deprived of . . . punitive power in every conceivable instance, but the important thing was that he

³⁵Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1959), p. 174.

³⁶Ibid.; Twenty years after the board Doolittle explained his thinking at the time in surprisingly similar words; "You must remember that this [the board] occurred shortly after the end of World War II which we thought was a war to end wars. The public was fed up with the military, fed up with war, fed up with discipline." Doolittle quoted in Glines, Doolittle, p. 174.

thought he had."³⁷ Four years later T. R. Fehrenbach in his history of the Korean War used all of Kinkead's arguments and illuminated the discrepancy between perception and reality. Fehrenbach pointed out that officers "had not been made wholly powerless--but they felt that they had been slapped in the teeth. He concluded that the real effect of the Doolittle board was psychological.³⁸ Despite the insight provided by these two writers, the prevalent view of the real effect of the Doolittle board is based on actual changes that allegedly were made as a result of the board's findings.

The most persistent allegation against the Doolittle board--one that is still extant today--is the connection with military justice. Morris Janowitz in his now standard work The Professional Soldier somewhat broke with the opinions of most military men when he argued that the board was forward looking and simply reflected the changing basis of military authority. He claimed that discipline would have to be based more on manipulation and less on authoritarian measures to be successful in modern society. However, he did imply that the board was responsible for the changes in military justice.³⁹ More recently Janowitz's fellow sociologist Charles C. Moskos has claimed that, largely as a result of Doolittle Board, major changes were made in improving military

³⁷Kinkead, In Every War But One, pp. 175-77, quote from p. 175.

³⁸T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: The Macmillian Co., 1963), p. 432.

³⁹Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), pp. 44, 50.

justice."⁴⁰ A year later Gen. Hamilton Howze agreed with Moskos and others who saw the link between the board and the justice system when he wrote,

Immediately after World War II, the Doolittle Board, responding to the complaints of soldiers who had been tried and punished during the war, recommended a vast watering down of the disciplinary system. This resulted in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.⁴¹

After reading these various claims and assertions concerning the recommendations of the board the appropriate question becomes; to what extent were the Doolittle board recommendations implemented in general and was there a causal relationship in the reshaping of concerning military justice procedures in particular? Since the military justice claims make up the potentially most serious changes it seems appropriate to address them first.

Besides requiring equal overall treatment under the law, recommendation number six contained two specific suggestions for change. First, it included a suggestion that wartime sentences be reviewed and clemency be granted where warranted. And second, it recommended that enlisted personnel be permitted on courts.⁴² When Patterson announced that he essentially accepted most of the recommendations he was careful to point out to the media that wartime cases were already under review and that he could take no action on the question of enlisted-men on courts until the

⁴⁰Charles C. Moskos, The American Enlisted Man (New York: Russell Sage Foundations, 1970), p. 9.

⁴¹Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, "Military Discipline & National Security," Army 21 (January 1971): 13.

⁴²Doolittle Report, p. 21.

Vanderbilt committee completed its study.⁴³ Follow up reports on 2 and 31 August concerning the implementation of the board recommendations listed no new actions.⁴⁴ Another progress report prepared a year later indicated that there was currently a bill before Congress that would allow enlisted-men to sit on courts-martial.⁴⁵ It appears that the press accepted these explanations, apparently in the belief that the War Department was action in advance on the complaints that were expressed to the Doolittle board.⁴⁶

The real story behind the rapid "response" to the findings of the board was quite different. By the time the board presented its findings and Patterson approved them, the War Department Advisory Board on Clemency had just about completed its review of

⁴³Press Release, 25 June 1946, The Honorable Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, Reviewing the Report of the Doolittle Board, Modern Military Division, War Department, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, RPP Safe File, Records Group 107, National Archives Building, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as OSW/RPP Safe File).

⁴⁴Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Implementations of the Doolittle Board Recommendations, 2 August 1946, OSW/RPP Safe File; Ibid., 31 August 1946; The 2 August report had been prepared for Patterson because of a newspaper article in early July which claimed that none of the recommendations had been implemented, see Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 10 July 1946, OSW/RPP Safe File; the 31 August report had been requested by Patterson when he issued his 25 June Press Release, see Eisenhower Papers, Vol. VII, p. 1159, footnote 4.

⁴⁵Progress of Implementation of the Doolittle Board's Recommendations, 17 September 1947, Modern Military Division, War Department, General Staff, Public Information Division 1921-1949, Press and Radio News Releases, Records Group 165, Box 123, National Archives Building, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as Press and News Release File, RG 165), this report was prepared as an answer to a congressional inquiry as to the status of the board's recommendations.

⁴⁶Army Times, 13 April 1946, pp. 1, 6.

wartime cases. This board, headed by former Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, had been appointed in 1945, several months before either the Doolittle board or the Vanderbilt committee.⁴⁷ In other words, the board's recommendation was already an accomplished fact.

The second specific recommendation, concerned with allowing enlisted-men to sit on courts-martial was more involved. The idea was certainly not new. In the spring of 1919, Senator George Chamberlain of Oregon introduced a bill in Congress which would have allowed enlisted-men to sit on courts in cases involving enlisted defendants.⁴⁸ The bill was defeated in 1919 but in 1948 the Articles of War were amended by the Elston Act and enlisted-men were finally allowed to participate.⁴⁹ The Elston amendment was itself replaced by the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1951. The Code retained the reform concerning enlisted participation and added many more important changes. The fact that the recommendation was eventually put into effect does not, however, establish a causal relationship with the Doolittle board's recommendation.

Many other influences outweighed the Doolittle board's recommendation when the enlisted court membership issue was discussed before both the 1948 and 1951 reforms were passed. When Undersecretary of War Royall testified at hearings on the Elston Bill he never mentioned the Doolittle board's recommendations, but

⁴⁷Ibid.; William T. Generous, Swords and Scales: The Development of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1973), pp. 16-17.

⁴⁸Generous, Swords and Scales, pp. 7-8.

⁴⁹Frederick Bernays Wiener, "The New Articles of War," Infantry Journal 63 (September 1948): 24.

claimed that the Vanderbilt committee had researched the question extensively. Royall noted that the committee had been surprised by the number of enlisted-men who were opposed to having members of the enlisted ranks serving on courts. They gave as their reason the fact that the noncommissioned officers were, in many instances, inclined to be considerably harsher than the officers.⁵⁰ Col. Frederick Bernays Wiener, an eminent military lawyer and long-time student of military justice who had testified before the Doolittle board, wrote an article in February 1947 in which he traced previous studies and actual experience with enlisted-men on courts. Wiener noted that the proposal⁵¹ was espoused by a wide range of factions and then gave his opinion of the value of it.

This particular proposal, in addition to being urged by the House Committee and by individual witnesses before the . . . Vanderbilt Committee, has been espoused in numerous editorials. It is in addition widely applauded by persons on the leftish fringe. I consider it a wholly specious proposal, actually the purest eyewash, which would not remedy any of the major defects now charged against the system.⁵¹

Significantly Wiener did not list the Doolittle board as one of the groups urging the adoption of the practice. Royall and Wiener were certainly prescient in their assessment of the proposal. Since the practice was adopted in 1948 enlisted personnel have rarely requested other enlisted-men to sit on their courts,

⁵⁰U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 2575, To Amend the Articles of War To Improve the Administration of Military Justice, To Provide for More Effective Appellate Review, To Insure the Equalization of Sentences, and for Other Purposes, 80th Cong., 1st sess.: 1947, pp. 1922-23.

⁵¹Frederick Bernays Wiener, "The Court-Martial System," Infantry Journal 60 (February 1947): 30.

having requested this privilege in only 2.6 percent of Army courts-martial in a representative sample period.⁵²

From the above information several conclusions can be drawn concerning the role of the Doolittle Board in relation to military justice reform. First the board had absolutely no influence on the decisions to convene either the Roberts Board on clemency or the Vanderbilt committee. Second the Doolittle recommendation for a review of war-time cases was a strawman to be knocked down by Patterson in his press release. And third, the Doolittle board played only a minor, if any, role in getting the enlisted court member proposal approved. Many other groups had espoused the same point and the Vanderbilt committee study seems to have played a dominant role in having it included in the Elston legislation. Even if the Doolittle recommendation had been important to the passage of this proposal the point at issue was insignificant and had little if any impact on discipline.

Despite this evidence, the role of the Doolittle board continues to be misunderstood. In 1961 Rear Admiral Robert J. White, who had headed a Navy board to study disciplinary practices in 1953, wrote an article that outlined this enduring error. He noted that "no myth has survived more successfully than the often repeated fiction that the Doolittle Board Army reforms 'led to a revision of the Code of Military Justice'."⁵³ White may not

⁵²James Pinn, Conscience and Command: Justice and Discipline in the Military (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 48.

⁵³Rear Admiral Robert J. White, "The Uniform Code of Military Justice--Its Promise and Performance (The First Decade: 1951-1961): The Background and the Problem," St. John's Law Review 35 (May 1961): 202.

have understood that the main purpose of the Doolittle board was to soak off criticism, but he clearly grasped the relationship of the board to later reform. He concluded that "It can readily be seen that this loose report centered upon social differences, fell far short of any comprehensive investigation, and was totally lacking in any specific recommendations for legislative reforms."⁵⁴ Since recommendation number six was the only one dealing directly with the military justice problem, the remaining recommendations need to be evaluated with respect to the broader charge that they contributed to slackened discipline.

The first recommendation of the board, concerning the improvement of leadership in the Army, was sure to be widely accepted among the senior officers. The whole caste problem was usually attributed to the abuse of privileges by poorly selected or poorly trained officers who had been thrown into the job during the hasty wartime expansion. Several months before the Doolittle board was appointed, Eisenhower expressed his opinion that "leadership in this was has, in many instances, been faulty."⁵⁵ He proposed to appoint a board to study the problem "in the hope that methods of selection and training might be devised to develop better leadership qualities in the future."⁵⁶ Patterson was also greatly concerned with the problem of training officers. He even suggested that a separate "leadership school" be set up within

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 203.

⁵⁵Eisenhower to Joseph Taggart McNarney, 6 December 1945, Eisenhower Papers, Vol. VII, p. 592.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 593.

the Army system.⁵⁷ It thus came as no surprise when the board recommended that officers be more carefully selected and that they be given more adequate orientation, indoctrination and effective training.

Many of the other specific suggestions of the board to improve leadership were widely accepted by the War Department hierarchy. For example, the board's suggestion that candidates have at least one year in the ranks before receiving officers training was generally agreed to by high ranking officers. Both Patterson and Gen. Collins had mentioned it before the board published its findings.⁵⁸ Eisenhower and General Carl Spaatz, in their testimony before the board, supported the idea of opening more opportunities for enlisted-men to gain commissions.⁵⁹ One of the most significant changes recommended was to inaugurate a promotion system based on merit rather than seniority. This had certainly been attempted before. None of the changes actually incorporated, which consisted largely of the institution of a Career Management Branch and changes in the Officer efficiency reporting system, caused any fundamental changes in the existing system of officer selection and training.

The second recommendation concerning more equitable

⁵⁷Patterson memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 23 April 1946, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Letters Vol. VI.

⁵⁸Patterson memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 28 December 1945, Patterson Papers, Box 26, Letters Vol. V: Collins testimony before the board, G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "A", Tab XIII.

⁵⁹Eisenhower testimony before the board, G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "A", Tab XIV; Spaatz, Ibid., Tab XIX.

distribution of base pay and allowances including food, quarters, uniforms and travel could be classified under three headings: those that were already taken care of, those in the process of being so, or those requiring congressional action to implement.⁶⁰ War Department Circular 88, issued the day before the first meeting of the board, solved the problem with uniforms by making them the same for all.⁶¹ Patterson claimed that the War Department had sponsored legislation calling for a twenty percent across the board pay increase when he issued his press release on 25 June.⁶² Four days later the President signed Public Law 474 providing increased pay on a sliding scale starting at fifty percent for private soldiers and reducing to ten percent for general officers.⁶³ Obviously Congress had been debating this long before the board's recommendations were published. The travel and quarters issues were beyond the power of the War Department to change and may have been included to apply pressure on Congress for more money.⁶⁴ The issues dealt with under this heading are certainly

⁶⁰Progress of Implementation of the Doolittle Board's Recommendations, 17 September 1947, Press and News Release File, RG 165.

⁶¹Implementation of the Doolittle Board Recommendations, 2 August 1946, OSW/RPP Safe File.

⁶²Press Release, 25 June, Ibid.

⁶³Implementation of the Doolittle Board Recommendations, 2 August 1946, Ibid.

⁶⁴Progress of Implementation of the Doolittle Board's Recommendations, 17 September 1947, Press and News Release File, RG 165, the last sentence under number two reads: "The extent to which War Department plans to construct adequate quarters within a given period can be developed is, of course, a reflection of the funds which can be allocated by Congress for that purpose."

important to morale but hardly affected an officer's ability to maintain discipline.

The third recommendation called for comparable procedures as to the accumulation of leave and terminal leave pay for officers and enlisted-men. Once again a strawman had been set up. Patterson's press release of 25 June simply stated that "This recommendation is approved."⁶⁵ He forgot to mention the fact that it had been approved by Army Regulation 615-275 dated 5 April.⁶⁶ The terminal leave recommendation was resolved by legislation already pending in Congress at the time Patterson announced his approval.⁶⁷ This recommendation thus had no causal effect.

Recommendations numbers four and eleven called for freedom to pursue normal social patterns off duty and the abolition of institutional requirements forbidding association of soldiers based on rank. Perhaps because these were rather nebulous recommendations or as Patterson put it "a matter of common sense" very little was done in this regard and what was done amounted to lip service. Patterson ordered the sentence "In the interest of good discipline, officers are required to wear distinctive uniforms, to live apart from their men in garrison, and to confine their social contacts to other officers" deleted from Field Manual 20-50 concerning Military Courtesy and Discipline.⁶⁸ Obviously the

⁶⁵Press Release, 25 June, OSW/RPP Safe File.

⁶⁶Implementation of the Doolittle Board Recommendations, 2 August 1945, Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Press Release, 25 June, Ibid.

the disappearance of this one sentence by itself did not change the existing relationship between officers and enlisted-men.⁶⁹

The fifth recommendation was designed to end discriminatory references directed at families of enlisted-men. The example given by the board was the infamous "officers and their ladies; enlisted-men and their wives" phrase. Patterson quickly agreed to the suggestion and directed the Adjutant General to review the regulations and eliminate any other such references.⁷⁰

Requirements as to the hand salute had been relaxed in 1922 and restored in 1929. They were relaxed again in 1940 and again restored in 1942. Thus when the board recommended easing the requirements again Patterson approved, as did Eisenhower and Collins.⁷¹ It was neither new nor did it have any measurable effect on discipline. In fact the change had little effect on anybody since it only applied to soldiers off-post and off-duty in the continental United States and in allied countries. Recommendation seven thus generated much more smoke than fire.

Patterson replied to the eighth recommendation, concerning the equitable distribution of decorations, by stating that he agreed with the objective sought. He went on to explain the problems associated with implementation and this in practice actually

⁶⁹It is interesting to compare the 1959 edition of the Officers Guide with reference to the deleted sentence. "In our Army, it is strong tradition that an officer does not gamble nor borrow money, nor drink intoxicants, nor participate in ordinary social association with enlisted-men on an individual basis," p. 18.

⁷⁰Press Release, 25 June, OSW/RPP Safe File.

⁷¹Ibid.; Eisenhower testimony before the board, G-1 file, Box 521, Exhibit "A", Tab XIV; Collins, Ibid., Tab XIII.

made no substantive change in the existing system.⁷²

The ninth recommendation suggested that the system for registering complaints be strengthened by including a proposal to have inspector general's reports sent outside command channels. Patterson claimed that the system had been strengthened by War Department Circular 74 issued on 14 March 1946--two weeks before the Doolittle board first met. The second part of the suggestion which entailed a basic change in the command structure was disapproved. Patterson claimed that he did not want to give the Inspector General's Department any tinge of "gestapo" or "undercover" status. Again, the basic structure had been preserved while the Secretary could claim that action had already been taken to correct the problem.⁷³

Recommendation ten would insure that regulations and instructions be so written that they would not only stipulate the limited privileges essential to the performance of duty but would also serve to minimize possible abuses. Patterson suggested that the best way to accomplish this was through a properly trained officer corps. The follow up reports claimed that such things as classes at West Point in the "Psychology of Leadership" would "do a great deal to fulfill this recommendation."⁷⁴ As in most of the previous points, the War Department solution to the problem had originated well before the Doolittle board even met.

⁷²Press Release, 25 June, OSW/RPP Safe File.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Implementation of the Doolittle Board Recommendations, 2 August 1946, Ibid.

In a letter to the Superintendent at West Point in early January 1946, Eisenhower expressed his opinion on the subject. He wrote: "I should like very much to see included in the curriculum . . . a course in practical or applied psychology." He believed that this course would "do much to improve leadership and personnel handling in the Army at large." Such a course was added later in 1946.⁷⁵ Whether or not this change met the requirements is questionable. The fact that the minor adjustments actually implemented had no effect on discipline is scarcely to be debated.

The last three recommendations were quickly dealt with by Patterson and almost no changes were made as a result. The twelfth dealing with the terms "enlisted-men" and "officers" was disapproved outright. As one sociologist explained it, "Since the fundamental structure was not to be changed, there was no point in changing names!"⁷⁶ Patterson shrugged off the thirteenth point calling for closer contact between military people and civilians by claiming that "Everything possible will be done to achieve this desirable objective."⁷⁷ The final recommendation, that further study be made, was also approved since it cost very little to say that the problem was being studied while a refusal would undoubtedly have attracted negative response from the

⁷⁵Eisenhower to Maxwell Davenport Taylor, 2 January 1946, Eisenhower Papers, Vol. VII, for the quotes see p. 710, for the reference to the 1946 curriculum see p. 712 footnote 5; The Sept. 1947 Progress Report shows evidence of poor staff work since they simply copied the status of implementation from the 2 August 1946 report including the sentence indicating that the class would be "starting this fall."

⁷⁶Dearborn G. Spindler, "The Doolittle Board and Cooptation In the Army," Social Forces 29 (March 1951): 310.

⁷⁷Press Release, 25 June, OSW/RPP Safe File.

media. The only apparent action taken was to prepare the progress report issued on 31 August 1946.

The overall effect of the implementation of the Doolittle board recommendations was specifically limited by the Secretary's original purpose for appointing the study. Of the fourteen recommendations two (9, 12) were, at least in part, disapproved outright. At least seven (1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10) had either partially or completely been previously implemented by actions initiated before the board issued its report or, in some cases, even before it was convened. The only recommendation that seems to have been implemented as a direct result of the Doolittle board was the change in saluting policy. Since the board was responsible for the appointment of neither the Roberts board nor the Vanderbilt committee and because it was not an important factor in getting the military justice reform bills passed, it essentially had no effect on the powers of junior officers to maintain discipline in their units. The claim that the main effect of the board was psychological probably comes closer to the truth. Since the reforms actually implemented in 1948 and 1951 did originate in the same postwar criticism that caused the Doolittle board and since the board did include a recommendation on military justice, it is easy to see why the "Caste system" study was incorrectly seen as the cause of the problems. The Doolittle board achieved Patterson's objectives of quieting public criticism without making any fundamental changes in the system. Conditions in the Army between 1945 and 1950 including: rapid rotation of individuals; lower levels of training for recruits who were needed as replacements; the distractions and relaxed atmosphere of

occupation duty; and a less demanding postwar training program all contributed to the poor showing of U. S. troops during the early days of Korea. Ironically, it seems that the efforts of Patterson and Doolittle to establish the legitimacy of the board were more effective with Army personnel than with the public. Doolittle's board was a handy scapegoat to be blamed for a myriad of problems.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The response of the U.S. Army to postwar criticism forms a body of experience that has largely been overlooked. Decision makers of today and tomorrow may gain useful insights by considering the problems and the attempted solutions of past administrations. Criticism of defense practices has, if anything, increased, especially in the post-Vietnam era. Insights from the post World War II period are still appropriate since the basic problem of obtaining qualified personnel for a relatively large standing force in peacetime has yet to be solved.

The criticism directed at internal Army practices posed the most significant threat to the basic structure of the Army in the immediate postwar period. In addition to the traditional American postwar reaction, the onset of the nuclear age caused all previous assumptions about defense to be reevaluated. If the War Department had done nothing to defend its basic structure, reformers with visions of clean, relatively cheap, push-button warfare might very well have destroyed the Army's ability to accomplish its ground combat mission. The situation reached a crisis when on the one hand runaway demobilization began to cut into the minimum forces needed to meet worldwide commitments, and on the other the forthcoming vote to renew the draft appeared doubtful. The only

unilateral action that the Army could take to resolve the problem was somehow to increase the number of volunteers. The clamor that arose in the early spring of 1946 was mainly directed at Army practices which supposedly made the service unattractive to the prospective soldier. This was the essence of the problem faced by Secretary Patterson when he took steps to relieve the pressure in the spring of 1946.

On the whole, Patterson was largely successful in defusing the potentially explosive situation. By appointing a panel of men with impeccable credentials to study the problem he took much of the force away from the arguments of critics. The Secretary enhanced the effect of the Doolittle board by implementing some minor but highly visible reforms even before its recommendations were released. When the board's findings were published, the changes suggested were generally peripheral to the fundamental structure of the military, and he approved them immediately. The few recommendations that did address issues central to the organization were either disapproved (No. 9), approved in vague terms (No. 1), or were put off because of other studies in progress (No. 6). The fact that the problem was being studied and that some actions had already been taken seems to have eased the eventual passage of the peacetime draft.

The most important insight to be gleamed from the demobilization experience involves a simpler solution than the Doolittle board. Two modifications to the War Department treatment of the problem eventually contributed to lowering the pressure. First, one of the most effective tactics was to have a widely respected military leader explain the problems to the public in

understandable terms. The media noted that pressure dropped noticeably when General Marshall and later General Eisenhower did this. The second tactic that proved effective was based upon understanding human nature. Much of the criticism which came from the soldiers themselves resulted from unfulfilled expectations. The War Department gained temporary relief from the storm of protest by publishing an unrealistically optimistic redeployment schedule. When available shipping almost immediately proved unable to meet the goals, many disappointed soldiers were understandably bitter. The fact that the Army eventually exceeded its own forecasts by over a million and a half during the last four months of 1945 was completely lost in the storm of protest that emanated from soldiers who were prematurely declared eligible for discharge. The message is simple; don't promise more than you can deliver.

The Army's postwar response to criticism must be evaluated in two parts corresponding to the two waves of criticism. The response to the demobilization clamor was not effective in maintaining sufficient numbers of effective military forces. The Doolittle board, on the other hand was in general successful in relieving the criticism of internal practices while maintaining essential military procedures for the preservation of discipline.

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Suitland, Maryland. Washington National Records Center, Modern Military Division. Records Group 165.

Box 520: This box holds the original copies of the Doolittle board testimony and source material. Most documents have many pencil corrections and are thus difficult to use. See Box 521 instead.

Box 521: This container holds the cleaned up versions of the drafts in 520. It contains five exhibits, A, B, C, D, and E which form the supporting material behind the report. The testimony of each witness was recorded and later transcribed and edited by Bender. All exhibits are tabbed and well organized.

Box 522: This box contains five large envelopes Tabs

I - V which contain all the miscellaneous materials and correspondence of the board. By far the most important section is Bender's "Daily Diary" contained in Tab V.

Washington, D.C. National Archives. Modern Military Records Division. Records Group 107, R. P. Patterson Safe File.

This file contains the 26 June 1946 Press Release in which Patterson announced his decisions concerning the implementation of the board's recommendations. It also holds the 2 August 1946 follow up report.

. Records Group 165.

Box 123: This box contains press and radio news releases 1 August - 30 September 1947. The 17 September implementation report is in this file.

Box 309: This box contains Eisenhower's memorandum of 1 June 1946 expressing his concern that the whole issue needed more study. It also contains a transcript of Eisenhower's testimony before the board.

. Moral Services Activities decimal file SPMS 330.11.

Box 374: This box contains the 27 March 1946 report listing the Army's current public relations problems in the order of their importance.

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